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I. INTRODUCTION
Scenario 1: Jane sees a newspaper advertisement
for her local drugstore offering Tylenol analgesics at
an attractive price. Jane decides to visit the drugstore
to purchase a bottle. When she gets to the analgesics
aisle, she notices a store-branded substitute for Tyle-
nol right next to Tylenol. The store brand is cheaper
than Tylenol, so Jane decides to purchase the store
brand instead. As she walks back to the cash register,
Jane notices that her favorite shampoo brand is
prominently displayed at the end of the aisle, so she
picks up a bottle of shampoo as well. Jane leaves the
drugstore a satisfied customer even though she did
not purchase any Tylenol-branded product- which
ostensibly was the reason for her drugstore visit in
the first place.
Every day, millions of consumers have experiences similar to
Jane's. Jane's choices, however, are not merely serendipitous. Instead,
the drugstore used several common retailing techniques, such as loss
leaders and shelf space adjacency, to induce Jane to make purchasing
decisions that increased the drugstore's profits from Jane's visit. Both
Jane and the drugstore may be happy with the results, but what about
McNeil-PPC, the owner of the Tylenol trademark? McNeil-PPC spent
many years and millions of dollars to build a well-known brand that
was strong enough to draw Jane to the drugstore. Yet, while the drug-
store and some third-party manufacturers profited from Jane's visit,
McNeil-PPC got nothing. Is this right? Or fair?
This Article discusses "brand spillovers," positive externalities
that occur when consumer interest in a trademark increases the profits
of third parties who do not own the trademark. Several brand spill-
overs occurred in Jane's scenario, benefiting both the drugstore and
the manufacturers of the store-branded analgesic and the shampoo.
While brand spillovers in the retail' context might appear superfi-
cially problematic, trademark owners, courts, and legislators do not
1. For the purposes of this Article, "retail" excludes all online stores.
[Vol. 22
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seem to object to them. Brand spillovers have been an integral part of
retailing practices .for decades, but they rarely result in trademark law-
suits. Instead, there appears to be widespread consensus that such re-
tailing practices are permissible under trademark law.
In contrast, the emergence of online intermediaries, such as
search engines, has raised serious questions about the propriety of
brand spillovers in the online context.
Scenario 2: Joe has a headache and wants to find
a place to buy Tylenol. He enters the search term
"Tylenol" into the Google search engine. Along with
the editorially generated search results, Google dis-
plays an ad for a third-party competitor's analgesic
because the competitor bought the keyword "Tyle-
nol" from Google.2 Joe clicks on the ad (thereby ge-
nerating revenue for Google), learns that the
competitive analgesic will meet his needs at a lower
cost, and chooses to buy the competitive product.
Like the drugstore in Jane's scenario, Google profits from Joe's
interest in a third-party trademark. Yet, unlike retailers' use of brand
spillovers, online brand spillover activities have been repeatedly at-
tacked in courts and legislatures. Trademark owners have repeatedly
sued Google and other online intermediaries for selling ads triggered
by searches for third-party trademarks (a process called "keyword
triggering"),3 and two states have banned some forms of keyword
triggering.4 The resulting policy and academic debate over keyword
triggering has been irresolute,5 reflecting wildly divergent views about
legitimacy of this practice.
This Article contrasts the seeming legitimacy of brand spillovers
by retailers with the putative illegitimacy of online brand spillovers.
The legal treatment of retailers' brand spillovers provides a fresh an-
gle from which to reconsider the keyword triggering debate. Upon
closer scrutiny, the dichotomous treatment appears to lack any basis,
which suggests that it may be a product of unwarranted cyberspace
exceptionalism. As a result, this Article proposes that both online and
offline intermediaries (including retailers, search engines, and others)
2. Although this scenario is typical of how consumers use search engines, this particular
scenario is partially hypothetical. On January 25, 2009, I did a search in Google for the term
"Tylenol" and received only one third-party ad for an online retailer.
3. See generally Eric Goldman, Keyword Law, http://www.ericgoldman.org/Resources/
keywordlaw.pdf.
4. The two states are Alaska and Utah. See infra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
5. See Goldman, supra note 3.
No. 2]
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should be equally free to use brand spillovers as part of their ongoing
efforts to reduce consumer search costs.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II describes retailers' ex-
tensive use of brand spillovers and how trademark law tolerates such
activities. Part III explains how online intermediaries are increasingly
providing the functions traditionally provided by retailers while facing
more trademark liability than retailers. Part IV explores the dichoto-
mous legal treatment and concludes it is the product of cyberspace
exceptionalism. Part IV then proposes to harmonize the legal treat-
ment applicable to all intermediaries to encourage intermediaries to
reduce consumer search costs, even if they profit from brand spill-
overs in doing so. Part V concludes.
II. RETAILERS AND TRADEMARK LAW
This Part explains how retailers routinely increase their profits by
creating brand spillovers but have not faced trademark liability for
these activities.
A. Retailers as Active Intermediaries
A typical distribution chain - the process by which manufactur-
ers distribute goods to consumers - has four stages: (1) the manufac-
turer makes the good,6 (2) the manufacturer sells the good to
distributors (there may be one or multiple levels of distributors in the
chain), (3) distributors sell the good to retailers, and (4) retailers sell
the good to consumers. Visually, a simple distribution chain looks like
this: 7
6. For simplicity, this Article assumes that manufacturers own the trademarks associated
with their goods. However, this need not be the case. For example, distributors can own a
trademark and outsource manufacturing of the associated goods to original equipment man-
ufacturers ("OEMs") or contract manufacturers.
7. Distribution chains can take on a nearly infinite number of varieties. For example,
manufacturers can sell directly to consumers, bypassing distributors and retailers altogether.
[Vol. 22
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Traditionally, many economists ignore the retailers' role in this
distribution chain. 8 They assume that retailers passively and accu-
rately aggregate consumer demand for products and communicate the
demand "up the chain" to manufacturers. 9 The rationale is that if a
retailer did anything else, that retailer would not satisfy consumer de-
mand while other retailers would, driving the nonconforming retailer
out of business. 10 Accordingly, these economists can ignore the retail-
ers' presence in the chain because, in their view, retailers simply act
as a pass-through agent for consumer preferences.
This assumption is wrong. In practice, retailers actively mediate
the relationship between manufacturers and consumers to maximize
their own profits," and retailers' profit-maximizing choices can sig-
nificantly affect the marketplace information communicated to manu-
8. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein & Joshua D. Wright, The Economics of Slotting Contracts,
50 J.L. & ECON. 421 (2007); Michael P. Lynch, Why Economists Are Wrong to Neglect
Retailing and How Steiner's Theory Provides an Explanation of Important Regularities, 49
ANTITRUST BULL. 911 (2004).
Economists also ignore the role of distributors in the distribution chain. For simplicity, I
do so as well because the ways distributors add value in the chain can vary widely by indus-
try. However, because distributors mediate the relationship between retailers and manufac-
turers, distributors could have the same profit-motivated bias on demand that this Article
ascribes to retailers.
9. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 8.
10. Id.
11. Id.
No. 2]
HeinOnline -- 22 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 385 2008-2009
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology
facturers. The remainder of this Section explains how retailers distort
supply and demand factors between manufacturers and consumers.
1. Retailers and the Supply Side
On the supply side, retailer intermediation precludes manufactur-
ers from maximizing profitable sales. First, retailers may choose not
to carry a manufacturer's goods at all. In the grocery store industry,
for example, retailers typically have enough physical selling space to
carry only a small fraction of the thousands of new products manufac-
turers introduce each year.' 2 In fact, when retailers allocate only
enough space to carry a single manufacturer's goods, their decision
effectively creates a winner-take-all situation,1 3 freezing out other
manufacturers from making any profitable sales through that retailer.
Because retailers' placement decisions can affect manufacturer profits
so significantly, manufacturers may gladly pay "slotting fees" and
other consideration to retailers to influence those decisions.
14
Even when retailers carry a manufacturer's goods, retailers do not
seek to maximize the manufacturer's profitable sales of those goods.
Instead, retailers seek to maximize their overall profit from each con-
sumer.15 Thus, if each manufacturer offers the same margin to the
retailer, retailers do not care which competing manufacturer sells a
particular item; when there are differences in margins between manu-
facturers, retailers want consumers to pick the highest margin good.
Further, retailers may try to "fire" customers who are unprofitable to
them,1 6 even if those customers would have generated profitable sales
for specific manufacturers. Collectively, retailers' profit-maximizing
choices prevent manufacturers from maximizing their own profitable
sales.
2. Retailers and the Demand Side
On the demand side, retailers do not just passively reflect con-
sumer demand. Instead, they routinely create and modify such de-
12. See, e.g., Vithala R. Rao & Edward W. McLaughlin, Modeling the Decision to Add
New Products by Channel Intermediaries, J. MARKETING, Jan. 1989, at 80; FOOD MKTG.
INST., FMI BACKGROUNDER: SLOTTING ALLOWANCES IN THE SUPERMARKET INDUSTRY,
http://www.fmi.org/media/bg/slottingfees2002.pdf.
13. See Benjamin Klein, Exclusive Dealing as Competition for Distribution "On the Mer-
its," 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 119, 120 (2003).
14. See generally Marianne M. Jennings et al., The Economics, Ethics and Legalities of
Slotting Fees and Other Allowances in Retail Markets, 21 J.L. & COM. 1 (2001) (describing
the variety of ways that retailers extract concessions from manufacturers).
15. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 13, at 139.
16. See generally LARRY SELDEN & GEOFFREY COLVIN, ANGEL CUSTOMERS & DEMON
CUSTOMERS (2003) (describing retailers' efforts to avoid undesirable customers).
[Vol. 22
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mand for their profit.1 7 Typically, retailers carefully and scientifically
design their stores to accomplish the singular goal of extracting more
money from consumer pockets. 8 For example retailer sales increase
when consumers spend more time in a store.' Accordingly, grocery
stores deliberately try to increase consumers' in-store time by locating
staple items (milk, eggs, bread, etc.) at the back of the store to induce
consumers to walk through the entire store and see other items of pos-
sible interest along the way.20
Retailers also shape consumer demand for a manufacturer's
goods through their pricing and placement decisions. First, retailers
set the final price charged to consumers. 21 To the extent price signals
quality,22 retailer-set pricing can affect consumer perceptions of a
manufacturer's good and thereby affect consumer demand for that
good. This demand-shaping effect is particularly pronounced when
retailers aggressively discount a luxury good, which can reduce long-
term consumer demand by degrading the good's perceived quality.
2 3
Retailer-set pricing can also affect consumers' relative demand for
complementary goods (the "cross-elasticities"), such as when a re-
tailer creates a product bundle composed of multiple manufacturers'
goods for a single price (e.g., a "buy cereal, get bananas free" offer).
Second, retailers control product placement in their stores, and
these product placement decisions can significantly affect consumer
demand for manufacturers' goods. Retailers generally have the unilat-
eral authority to determine where to place manufacturers' products
17. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evi-
dence ofMarket Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1444-50 (1999); Klein & Wright,
supra note 8, at 431-32.
18. See DAVID WEINBERGER, EVERYTHING IS MISCELLANEOUS 1-7 (2007) (describing
Staples's laboratory store, which it uses to test different retailing practices); Jack Hitt, The
Theory ofSupermarkets, N.Y. TtMES, Mar. 10, 1996, § 6 (Magazine), at 56 ("[Ejach inch of
(grocery store] space is scientifically calibrated to hold only what you will buy at the highest
possible margin.").
19. See PACO UNDERHILL, WHY WE BUY 33, 37, 102 (1999); Hitt, supra note 18 (citing
research demonstrating that each extra minute a shopper spends in a supermarket beyond the
average visit length generates an additional $1.89 of sales).
20. See UNDERHILL, supra note 19, at 82; WEINBERGER, supra note 18, at 2; Hanson &
Kysar, supra note 17, at 1447. Drugstores position the pharmacy department at the back of
the store for the same reason. See UNDERHILL, supra note 19, at 82-83.
21. Manufacturers exercise some indirect control over consumer prices by setting whole-
sale prices. Further, manufacturers can try to exercise control over retailer pricing through
contractual minimum price obligations. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v.
PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007). Many retailers will honor manufacturer-set price floors,
but even in those cases the retailer controls the final pricing determination (although a price
below the floor might get the retailer kicked out of the authorized distribution chain).
22. See, e.g., David J. Curry & Peter C. Riesz, Prices and Price/Quality Relationships: A
Longitudinal Analysis, J. MARKETING, Jan. 1988, at 36, 36; Paul Milgrom & John Roberts,
Price andAdvertising Signals ofProduct Quality, 94 J. POL. ECON. 796, 799 (1986).
23. For this reason, manufacturers have repeatedly sought legal mechanisms to restrict
unwanted retailer price discounting, including (most notably) state fair trade acts. See gen-
erally Note, Fair Trade Laws and Discount Selling, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1327 (1951) (discuss-
ing criticisms of fair trade statutes).
No. 2]
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within their store - including placing the product in a category in the
retailer's taxonomy of products, as well as the specific shelf in that
product category. The retailers' absolute discretion may look less
clear when retailers ask manufacturers to help develop shelf-by-shelf
product configuration plans (called "planograms")24 or designate a
manufacturer as a "category captain" to help organize the retailer's
entire product category (including placement of competitors' prod-
ucts). 25 However, even when retailers outsource category placement
or category management to manufacturers, retailers retain their final
decision-making authority over placement decisions.26
Retailers' placement decisions can affect consumer demand for a
product in a variety of ways. Shelf placement may affect consumer
brand perceptions by implicitly communicating information about the
product's importance and meaning.27 For example, a bookstore's
prominent display of a book, such as in the store's front area, may
cause consumers to infer that the book is popular.
28
24. See, e.g., Uniek, Inc. v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 500 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1161 (W.D. Wis.
2007) ("A planogram is 'a diagram of fixtures and products that illustrates how and where
retail products should be displayed, usually on a store shelf in order to increase customer
purchases'; it assigns a 'specific amount of space ... to specific items in the store."'); Pose-
ly v. Eckerd Corp., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1294 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
Manufacturers may also (at their expense) provide retailers with physical display units.
See, e.g., Meyers Printing Cos. v. Desa, LLC, No. 06-255 ADM/AJB, 2007 WL 2907996, at
*2 (D. Minn. Oct. 2, 2007); W. Publ'g Co. v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., No. 94 C 6803, 1995 WL
1684082, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 2, 1995).
25. See Leo S. Carameli, Jr., Note, The Anti-Competitive Effects and Antitrust Implica-
tions of Category Management and Category Captains of Consumer Products, 79 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1313, 1316 (2004); Robert L. Steiner, Category Management - A Pervasive,
New Vertical/Horizontal Format, ANTITRUST, Spring 2001, at 77, 77; see also Conwood
Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 785 (6th Cir. 2002); Meyers, 2007 WL 2907996, at
*1; Uniek, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 1158.
26. El Aguila Food Prods. Inc. v. Gruma Corp., 301 F. Supp. 2d 612, 615 n.5 (S.D. Tex.
2003) ("The plaintiffs admit that the retailers, not Gruma, approve placements."); Bristol-
Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 182, 201 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'don other
grounds, 973 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Despite McNeil's assertions that it provides a
planogram to each of its retailers - a claim which the Court readily finds credible - it has
little if any ability to control and monitor the placement of TYLENOL PM on a daily ba-
sis."); R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N.V., 689 F. Supp. 76, 81 (D. Conn. 1988), rev'd on
other grounds, 867 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing an affidavit stating that "it is [the re-
tailer], and not Lipton or any other supplier, which decides shelf location and how much
space each product will receive in the allocation").
27. See MICHAEL R. SOLOMON, CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 318-20 (7th ed. 2004) (discuss-
ing the importance of product categorization); UNDERHILL, supra note 19, at 202 (noting
that product juxtapositions educate consumers); WEINBERGER, supra note 18; cf. Christina
L. Brown & Aradhna Krishna, The Skeptical Shopper: A Metacognitive Account for the
Effects of Default Options on Choice, 31 J. CONSUMER RES. 529 (2004) (discussing how
marketers' merchandising decisions communicate information to consumers).
28. See Randy Kennedy, Cash Up Front, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2005, § 7 (Book Review),
at 14; see also UNDERHILL, supra note 19, at 91 (discussing how Blockbuster was encour-
aged to deliberately "spike" the trolley of returned videos with old movies as a way of
"making them seem current and desirable," in turn alleviating demand for limited copies of
new releases).
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Retailer placement also may educate consumers about new uses
of a product by creating associations between complementary prod-
ucts (e.g., putting apples in the cheese aisle) or informing consumers
that seemingly non-competitive products are actually substitutes for
each other (e.g., putting baking soda or lemon juice in the household
cleaners aisle). Because it teaches consumers about novel, comple-
mentary, or substitutable uses, a retailer's placement decisions can
also affect a product's cross-elasticities of demand with other prod-
ucts.
Retailer placement also serves as advertising for manufacturers'
products. Shelf placement can inform new consumers about a prod-
uct's availability and remind existing consumers to consider a prod-
uct.29 For products with limited access to mainstream advertising
vehicles (such as cigarettes or alcohol), shelf placement can be an
essential form of advertising.
30
Shelf placement also can boost consumer demand for a manufac-
turer's goods by spurring unplanned ("impulse") purchases. Accord-
ing to retail anthropologist Paco Underhill, "[a]bout 60 to 70 percent
of the things we buy in supermarkets and convenience stores we had
no intention of buying when we walked in the door,"31 and shelf
placement can play a critical role in stimulating those impulse pur-
chases.32 Thus, grocery stores put kid-appealing items on lower
shelves (where kids are more likely to see them) and high-margin
items at the checkout stand (when consumers have their wallets out),33
in each case increasing the likelihood of sales. Meanwhile, if a retailer
places a manufacturer's products in obscure locations, such as at the
back of the store or too high or low on shelves, then consumer de-
mand for the product can diminish accordingly.34
29. See generally Klein, supra note 13 (discussing placement as a type of "promotional
service" provided by retailers); FOOD MKTG. INST., supra note 12, at 2. Manufacturers have
reduced mass media marketing spending and redirected those dollars to convincing grocers
to give more prominent in-store promotion; due to consumer infoglut, "consumers can be
reached most effectively in the stores where they actually buy groceries." Id.
30. See David Segal, Philip Morris, Leader of the Packs: Cigarette Maker's Rivals Sue
Over Display Racks, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1999, at El; see also Louise Story, Product
Packages Now Shout to Grab Your Fickle Attention, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2007, at Al
(describing how shelf-based advertising becomes even more important as fewer consumers
see television commercials).
31. Underhill was quoted in Segal, supra note 30; see also Jacqueline J. Kacen & Julie
Anne Lee, The Influence of Culture on Consumer Impulsive Buying Behavior, 12 J.
CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 163, 163 (2002) (noting that in some product categories, impulse
buying is up to 80% of sales); Hitt, supra note 18 (noting that only 1/3 of consumers' su-
permarket purchases are planned; the remainder are "splurchases").
32. See, e.g., UNDERHILL, supra note 19, at 79 (discussing the value of "endcaps," dis-
plays at the end of the aisle).
33. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 17, at 1446-50; see also UNDERHIL, supra note 19,
at 18-19 (noting that retailers place pet food treats on lower shelves because children are the
principal decision-makers for these purchases).
34. See UNDERHILL, supra note 19, at 80-81, 84 ("[T]he rear wall is the dead zone.").
No. 2]
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B. Retailers Actively Capitalize on Brand Spillovers
The previous Section illustrated how retailers play an active in-
termediary role between consumers and manufacturers in ways that
affect both marketplace supply and demand. This Section focuses on
four retailer intermediation practices that use third-party trademarks to
increase retailer profits.35
Loss Leaders. To stimulate consumer traffic to their stores, retail-
ers often prominently advertise a popular branded product at a signifi-
cant discount (a "loss leader").36 The retailer anticipates that
consumers coming to the store for the loss leader will also purchase
other products. In effect, retailers use the trademarked loss leader to
stimulate profitable sales of third-party manufacturers' products.
Shelf Space Adjacency. Retailers typically place related products
from multiple manufacturers into a physically adjacent group of sub-
stitutable and complementary products, such as the analgesics section
of a drug store or the bread aisle in a grocery store. This adjacency
between related products inevitably creates brand spillovers among
the products. 37 Consumers may come to the store specifically inter-
ested in brand X but, when exposed to competitive or complementary
brands in physical proximity, may make unplanned or impulse deci-
sions to choose brand Y instead (or to purchase both).38
Retailers can deliberately take advantage of these inevitable brand
spillovers to increase their profits. When profit margins for physically
adjacent competitive products are the same, adjacency-caused spill-
overs are profit-neutral to the retailer. However, retailers can deliber-
ately position a high-margin item next to a low-margin item with the
hope that some consumers pick the high-margin item as an alterna-
tive.39 For example, retailers generally make greater margins on
"house brands ', ° than heavily promoted third-party branded prod-
35. See generally Klein, supra note 13 (discussing how retailers can free-ride on manu-
facturer investments).
36. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1034 (4th ed. 2000).
37. See UNDERHILL, supra note 19, at 89 ("[E]veryone knows that adjacencies are of
huge importance to every product .... Great retail minds churn themselves into mush trying
to unravel the mysteries of which products should be sold near one another for maximum
spark and synergy.").
38. See Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Superior Court ex rel E. & J. Gallo Winery, 90
Cal. Rptr. 2d 743, 747 (Ct. App. 1999) (relating how Gallo's sales representatives designed
retailers' planograms "to place an inferior, lower-priced Gallo product adjacent to a higher-
priced category leader. The category leader's display attracts the consumer's attention.
When the consumer reaches for the well-known product, he or she will see the lower-priced
Gallo product, and may buy that product instead."); see also UNDERHILL, supra note 19, at
201.
39. See Klein, supra note 13.
40. "House brands" are products that a retailer sells under its own proprietary brand, of-
ten in competition with a well-known third-party manufacturer's brand. Other synonyms for
house brands include "store brands," "private label brands," "own brands," and the misno-
mer "generic brands." See generally McNeil Nutritionals, LLC v. Heartland Sweeteners,
[Vol. 22
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uCtS.4 1 When retailers put house brands adjacent to heavily promoted
42brands, retailers hope consumers pick the more profitable house
brand.43
Pre- and Post-Sale Merchandising. Retailers can use a con-
sumer's expressed interest in a trademark to merchandise other goods
and services to them.
Pre-sale, a retailer may explicitly redirect a consumer in response
to the consumer's expressed brand preferences. A consumer may ask
for a specific brand that the retailer does not carry, and the retailer
may suggest alternatives that are in stock. Alternatively, a consumer
may request a branded product that the retailer carries, but a retail
salesperson may try to sell the consumer on an alternative brand (such
as one resulting in a larger commission to the salesperson).44
Another pre-sale merchandising technique is for retailers to place
prominent, high-demand brands in otherwise low-traffic locations
where consumers will seek them out. Retailers can place popular
brands further back in the store as a way of getting consumers to walk
through a store and be exposed to more merchandise from other man-
ufacturers.4 5
Post-sale, a retailer may try to obtain additional sales based on its
knowledge of the consumer's purchase of specific brands. For exam-
ple, some grocery stores use Catalina Marketing's post-purchase cou-
pon system to deliver coupons for competing third-party products
triggered by a consumer's actual grocery purchases. 46 In these situa-
tions, consumers who buy a six-pack of Coca-Cola soda might get a
coupon for a subsequent purchase of a six-pack of Pepsi. As another
LLC, 511 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2007) (discussing "[p]resence and effect of... [s]tore-brand
products"); Andrew W. Coleman, National Brands, Private Labels and Unfair Competi-
tion - When Imitation Goes Beyond the Sincerest Form of Flattery, 87 TRADEMARK REP.
79 (1997) (examining the role of "private label products" in the market place).
41. See New York v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 321, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1995);
Lynch, supra note 8, at 927-28 ("[R]etailers usually price 'leading national brands' (LBs)
so that they yield lower [margins] than on competing fringe brands or on 'store brands'
(SBs) .... [T]he more prominent the brand, the lower its retail margin.").
Often, the branded product and the house-branded product are made by competitors.
However, sometimes the same manufacturer makes both products. See infra note 110 and
accompanying text.
42. Specifically, the prominent brand should go directly at eye-level and the higher mar-
gin substitute brand should go to its immediate right. See UNDERHILL, supra note 19, at 77-
78,204.
43. See Kraft, 926 F. Supp. at 348; Jean-Noel Kapferer, Brand Confusion: Empirical
Study of a Legal Concept, 12 PSYCHOL. & MARKETNG 551, 552 (1995).
44. See Klein, supra note 13, at 152. Although it may sound like "bait and switch," a sa-
lesperson's diversionary tactics are not automatically a § 43(a) Lanham Act violation. Nor-
ton Tire Co. v. Tire Kingdom Co., 858 F.2d 1533, 1534 (11 th Cir. 1988).
45. See UNDERHtLL, supra note 19, at 82 (noting that retailers want to put popular brands
in the middle of aisles to draw consumers down the aisles and be exposed to other products,
whereas manufacturers prefer to be at the higher-visibility aisle ends).
46. See JOSEPH TuROW, NIcHE ENvY 141 (2006).
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example, Amazon suggests that consumers buy books from third-
party publishers based on the consumer's past book purchases.
Store Clustering. Retailers can increase their profits by physicallyv
locating stores adjacent to a popular high-traffic destination store.
Malls use "anchor tenants" (stores with big marketing budgets or a
strong brand) to bring in traffic that spills over to other tenants. 48 As
another example, competitive retailers - such as car dealers or gas
stations- may cluster together to take advantage of each other's
overflow traffic. 4 9 In some cases, a retailer can save marketing dollars
if it can rely on an adjacent retailer's ability to attract customers.
C. Retailers Avoid Trademark Liability for Brand Spillovers
The previous two Sections established that retailers actively mod-
erate the relationship between manufacturers and consumers, includ-
ing intentionally using manufacturer or other third-party trademarks to
increase their profits. With retailers routinely and deliberately profit-
ing at the putative expense of trademark owners, one might infer that
(1) manufacturers routinely sue retailers for capitalizing on brand spil-
lovers, and (2) retailers are liable for trademark infringement accord-
ingly. However, my research revealed little support for either
inference.
1. Manufacturers Rarely Sue Retailers
A number of retailer practices can create trademark infringement
liability for the retailers. Retailers offer goods and services under their
own brands, 50 and these brands may infringe on other brands' trade-
47. See Charles Q. Choi, Atomic Physics Predicts Successful Store Location,
LIVESCENCE, Sept. 27, 2006, http://www.livescience.com/strangenews/060927_business_
physics.html (noting that proximity of complementary stores may increase odds of a new
business' success); cf Michael Fitzgerald, Predicting Where You'll Go and What You 'l
Like, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2008, at BU4 (describing efforts to use location data from cell-
phone GPSs and taxi drivers to identify valuable adjacencies).
48. See Malcolm Gladwell, The Terrazzo Jungle, NEW YORKER, Mar. 15, 2004, at 120,
123 ("The point of a mall - the reason so many stores are clustered together in one build-
ing - is to allow smaller, less powerful retailers to share in" traffic generated by depart-
ment stores.). Note that the mall operator often also benefits from optimizing the tenant mix,
both from increased rents and from the mall operator's share of tenants' gross receipts.
49. See Gallo Motor Ctr. Corp. v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 204 F. Supp. 2d 144, 153
(D. Mass. 2002); Northside Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 603 F. Supp. 2, 5 (D.
Minn. 1983).
Clustering can also produce negative spillovers. For example, a retailer may not want to
locate next to a bank because people walk past banks quickly, reducing the chance that
passing consumers will see the adjacent retailer's window display. See UNDERHELL, supra
note 19, at 76.
50. See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 16:47 (4th ed. 2008).
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marksi l In particular, house brands are often designed to resemble the
trade dress or trademarks of third parties. 52 Manufacturers can and
occasionally do sue retailers for overly similar house brands,5 3 al-
though manufacturers may be reluctant to do so. 54 Lawsuits can also
occur if a neighboring store adopts an overly similar trade dress to an
existing store 5 Retailers can be held liable for carrying and reselling
third-party goods that infringe trademarks,56 but retailers are rarely
sued for doing so. Indeed, retailers usually are not named as defen-
dants in typical manufacturer-v.-manufacturer trademark infringement
lawsuits. In fact, the parties and the judge often overlook how retailers
may have contributed to the possible consumer confusion. Several
examples illustrate this omission.
First, courts may consider the physical proximity or adjacency of
the litigants' goods in retail stores as a factor in its likelihood of con-
sumer confusion analysis, 57 even though retailers - not manufactur-
51. See, e.g., Grocery Outlet Inc. v. Albertson's Inc., 497 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2007); Au-
toZone, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 373 F.3d 786 (6th Cir. 2004).
52. See Coleman, supra note 40, at 80-81; Kapferer, supra note 43.
53. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 50, § 23:53; Kapferer, supra note 43, at 553 ("Only a
few companies have gone to the courts to stop [house brands]."); see also, Adidas Am., Inc.
v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (D. Or. 2008); McNeil-PPC, Inc. v.
Guardian Drug Co., 984 F. Supp. 1066 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (granting a preliminary injunction
for trade dress infringement against a manufacturer of a store brand). The Adidas case led to
a $305 million jury verdict, one of the largest trademark judgments on record. See Posting
of Dan Slater to the Wall Street Journal Law Blog, Adidas v. Payless: $100 Million for
Every Stripe; Payless Could Pay More, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/05/07/adidas-v-
payless- 1 00-million-for-every-stripe-payless-could-pay-more/ (May 7, 2008).
54. E.g., McKeon Prods. Inc. v. Flents Prods. Co., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1032 (E.D.
Mich. 2003). In McKeon, a manufacturer sued only the manufacturer of retailers' house
brands for infringing trade dress and not the retailers - even though the retailers had pro-
vided their trade dress to the house brand manufacturer. Id. Reasons for this reluctance are
discussed in Part IV.A infra.
55. For example, numerous pre-Lanham Act cases found unfair competition when a new
store would open next to an existing store and adopt a similar name or trade dress designed
to divert the original store's customers. See, e.g., Weinstock, Lubin & Co. v. Marks, 42 P.
142 (Cal. 1895); Lichtenstein v. Levin, 27 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 337 (Com. P1. Ct. 1927).
For a more recent example, see Toy Mfrs. of Am., Inc. v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 960 F.
Supp. 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). In this case, the plaintiff operated a major and well-established
conference in defendant's facilities. Id. at 676. Defendant launched a competitive and simi-
larly named conference simultaneously in the same building. Id. at 677. Further, the defen-
dant used the building's security procedures to co-register attendees for the defendant's
conference, which made it easy for plaintiff's attendees to attend defendant's conference
and enabled plaintiff's exhibitors to reach the same audience by paying defendant instead of
plaintiff. Id. As a result, the court cited the conferences' physical proximity and temporal
adjacency (among other factors) in finding a likelihood of consumer confusion. Id. at 682.
56. Trademark infringement is a strict liability claim, so scienter is not required to estab-
lish a prima facie case. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 50, § 25:57.
57. A number of cases have held that retailer decisions to proximately locate products in-
crease the risk of consumer confusion. See, e.g., E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co.,
967 F.2d 1280, 1291 (9th Cir. 1992); Conde Nast Publ'ns, Inc. v. Am. Greetings Corp., 329
F.2d 1012, 1013 (C.C.P.A. 1964); Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., 279 F.2d 607, 612
(2d Cir. 1960); Pure Foods, Inc. v. Minute Maid Corp., 214 F.2d 792, 797 (5th Cir. 1954);
Mexican Food Specialties, Inc. v. Festida Foods, Ltd., 953 F. Supp. 846, 853 (E.D. Mich.
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ers - determine product placements. For example, in In re Martin's
Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc.,58 the senior user had a trademark regis-
tration for cheese, and a junior user appealed a trademark registration
denial for bread. In affirming the denial, the Federal Circuit noted that
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board could consider that "deli coun-
ters may well display bread and rolls in close proximity to the cold
cuts and cheeses purveyed there." 59 If so, the junior user-
manufacturer's trademark registration will depend on how retailers
decide to place its product.
Second, retailers can aggregate or disaggregate third-party goods
into new product offerings, and this bundling can affect a court's
trademark analysis. In a manufacturer-v.-manufacturer lawsuit, re-
tailers bundled similarly branded cigarettes and alcohol (both con-
tained the word "Death" in their trademarks) made by different
manufacturers into a single-price package. 61 The court cited the prod-
uct bundles as evidence that the goods catered to similar customer
bases, even though the retailers unilaterally created the bundles with-
out authorization from either trademark owner. Yet, neither trademark
owner sued retailers for creating these bundles.
Third, in another manufacturer-v.-manufacturer lawsuit, some re-
tailers stocked an allegedly infringing product under shelf signage
displaying the different brand name.62 Even so, the manufacturer did
not name the retailers as defendants - even though the court repeat-
edly noted that the retailers appeared to have been responsible for the
alleged wrongdoing.63
1997); Storck USA, L.P. v. Farley Candy Co., 797 F. Supp. 1399, 1409 (N.D. Ill. 1992);
Proxite Prods., Inc. v. Bonnie Brite Prods. Corp., 206 F. Supp. 511,516 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
Similarly, a number of cases have held that retailer decisions to place products in sepa-
rate areas of a store reduce the risk of consumer confusion. See, e.g., Gray v. Meijer, Inc.,
295 F.3d 641, 649-50 (6th Cir. 2002); Plus Prods. v. Plus Disc. Foods, Inc., 722 F.2d 999,
1008 (2d Cir. 1983); Sunenblick v. Harrell, 895 F. Supp. 616, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Lever
Bros. Co. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 537 F. Supp. 248, 254 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Nestle Co. v. Nash-
Finch Co., No. 68,330, 1987 WL 123836 (T.T.A.B. May 28, 1987).
Munsingwear, Inc. v. Jockey International, Inc., Civ. No. 4-93-538, 1994 WL 422280, at
*5 (D. Minn. Apr. 21, 1994), reaches a slightly different conclusion: "In a market controlled
by only a few producers it is inevitable that one brand will be located near another. Effi-
ciency and customer assistance dictate that many stores will display and sell all similar
products in relatively close proximity." Id.
58. 748 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
59. Id. at 1567.
60. See Storck USA, 797 F. Supp. at 1411 n.13 (ignoring evidence that retailers some-
times break apart a manufacturer's packaging to sell candy items individually).
61. Death Tobacco, Inc. v. Black Death USA, No. CV 92-6437-WMB, 1993 WL 761982,
at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 1993).
62. Optimum Techs., Inc. v. Henkel Consumer Adhesives, Inc., 496 F.3d 1231, 1246
(11 th Cir. 2007).
63. See id. at 1242-43.
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2. Retailers Are Not Liable for Brand Spillovers
Consistent with the fact that judges and plaintiffs ignore retailers'
active intermediation of manufacturers' products, judges and plaintiffs
also routinely ignore retailers' intentional efforts to create - and
profit from - brand spillovers. In the rare situations where courts
discuss brand spillovers in a trademark case, they have generally held
or suggested that the retailer activities do not constitute trademark
infringement.
For example, retailers profiting from store shelf adjacency do not
infringe trademarks. Courts generally permit retailers to sell house
brands that are similar to third-party brands, even when the retailer
clearly is capitalizing on consumer demand for the third-party branded
product.
64
Further, courts routinely have said that retailers do not commit
trademark infringement simply because house-branded products sit
next to the national branded products. For example, a court rejected
Shell Oil's effort to enjoin a gas station that sold a house brand of
gasoline side-by-side with Shell-branded gasoline, even if customers
were drawn into the station by Shell signage.
65
If anything, courts may view such product adjacencies as positive,
not negative. In a case not involving trademarks, the court said that
"[p]roduct adjacencies are a marketing strategy whereby a wine pro-
ducer attempts to have its brands displayed adjacent to the market
leader brand in the relevant price segment .... Product adjacencies
are lawful and commonly used."
66
Judges have endorsed other brand spillover practices in trademark
cases, including:
0 Salesperson redirection of consumers asking for a particular
brand. One court observed that "store employees who urge consumers
to try or use the store brand product are certainly within their rights so
64. See, e.g., Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep't Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556, 1565 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (finding that a similar house brand did not create a likelihood of confusion); McKeon
Prods. Inc. v. Flents Prods. Co., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1032, 1039 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (find-
ing no consumer confusion when retailers deliberately made house brands with similar trade
dress to the national brands "not to confuse the customer into thinking they were buying
McKeon's product, but rather to force the customer to choose between the more expensive
brand name and the less expensive private label"); Smithkline Beckman Corp. v. Pennex
Prods. Co., 605 F. Supp. 746, 751-52 (E.D. Pa. 1985) ("Placing the enteric coated aspirin in
close proximity to ECOTRIN® highlights the housebrand product, but that is not unfair,
only competitive."); see also Patricia B. Cunningham & Erin C. Witkow, Private-Label
Versions: Free Enterprise or Freeloading?, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 27, 2007, at SI.
65. Shell Trademark Mgmt. BV v. Canadian Am. Oil Co., No. 02-01365 EDL, 2002 WL
32104586, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2002).
66. Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Superior Court ex rel. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 90 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 743, 752 (Ct. App. 1999).
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long as there is no attempt to deceive the public as to the source of the
goods."
67
* Store clustering. One court stated that "an individual in
search of a McDonald's restaurant will often be confronted with a
Burger King restaurant. As long as Burger King did not mislead the
consumer under false pretenses to its location, the mere fact that it
decided to place itself in close proximity to a McDonald's, in an effort
to potentially draw customers in search of fast food, is not 'passing
off. '68
* Using popular brands to draw consumers through a store and
increase exposure of other brands. A Ninth Circuit judge's observa-
tion is apt:
For example, consider the following scenario: I walk
into Macy's and ask for the Calvin Klein section and
am directed upstairs to the second floor. Once I get
to the second floor, on my way to the Calvin Klein
section, I notice a more prominently displayed line
of Charter Club clothes, Macy's own brand, de-
signed to appeal to the same people attracted by the
style of Calvin Klein's latest line of clothes. Let's
say I get diverted from my goal of reaching the Cal-
vin Klein section, the Charter Club stuff looks good
enough to me, and I purchase some Charter Club
shirts instead. Has Charter Club or Macy's infringed
Calvin Klein's trademark, simply by having another
product more prominently displayed before one
reaches the Klein line? Certainly not.
69
Yet other brand spillover practices appear to be unlitigated or
rarely litigated. My research did not reveal any trademark infringe-
ment lawsuits over post-sale competitive couponing against Catalina
Marketing (the manufacturer of the most popular post-sale couponing
system), any retailers deploying Catalina Marketing's system, or any
advertisers purchasing the right to deliver competitive coupons. My
67. Smithkline Beckman, 605 F. Supp. at 752. But see Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc.,
692 F.2d 1250, 1252 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that a restaurant's unannounced substitution
of Pepsi in response to orders for "Coke" or "Coca-Cola" was trademark infringement).
68. FragranceNet.com, Inc. v. FragranceX.com, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d 545, 551 (E.D.N.Y.
2007).
69. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir.
2004) (Berzon, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
70. In July 2007, I searched Westlaw's "ALLCASES" database for the search term "Cat-
alina Marketing" and looked at every federal district court case in PACER listing Catalina
Marketing as a defendant. In January 2009, I also researched every case where Catalina
Marketing was a litigant in the Stanford 1P Litigation Clearinghouse
(http://lexmachina.stanford.edu). Cf Posting of Eric Goldman to Technology & Marketing
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research also did not identify any trademark lawsuits over the adver-
tising of loss leaders to create brand spillovers.
71
D. Implications
This Part has exposed a seeming legal anomaly. Retailers are
treated as passive actors in the legal analysis of trademark infringe-
ment cases, but retailers in fact play an active role in mediating the
manufacturer-consumer experience and often use manufacturers'
trademarks to increase their own profits. Given this active intermedia-
tion, it seems odd that retailers do not face greater legal exposure un-
der trademark law.72 The next Part sharpens the anomaly by showing
how trademark liability might attach to analogous active intermedia-
tion in the online context. The Article will then explore some possible
explanations for this anomaly in Part IV.
III. ONLINE INTERMEDIARIES AND TRADEMARK LAW
This Part offers a contrast to the legal anomaly identified in the
previous Part. It explores how online intermediaries perform similar
functions as retailers but face significantly greater potential trademark
liability for the way they perform those functions.
A. Online Intermediaries Have Usurped Retailers'Role in the Chain
During the 1990s, there was much speculation that the Internet
would lead to widespread disintermediation of various intermediar-
73ies. While much of this discussion was idealistic, perhaps naively so,
the Internet has helped manufacturers disintermediate distributors and
74
retailers by selling directly to consumers.
Law Blog, Utah Amends Trademark Protection Act (But Only After Some Drama),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/03/utahamends tra.htm (Mar. 7, 2008) (discuss-
ing how the Utah legislature considered, but ultimately did not pass, a law that unintention-
ally appeared to regulate the Catalina Marketing system).
71. Loss leaders are regulated under other doctrines, such as laws against bait-and-switch
practices, predatory pricing and pricing below cost. See IA Louis ALTMAN & MALLA
POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES 5-268 to
-269, § 5:53 (4th ed. 2008).
72. Cf. Eric Schlachter, Cyberspace, the Free Market and the Free Marketplace of Ideas:
Recognizing Legal Differences in Computer Bulletin Board Functions, 16 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENT. L.J. 87, 145 (1993) (discussing how liability and editorial control are typically
linked). As discussed in notes 71 and 177, brand spillovers might be governed by doctrines
other than trademark law depending on the precise facts.
73. See Michael Hammer, The Myth ofDisintermediation, INFO. WEEK, July 10, 2000, at
150, 150.
74. Dell Computers is a flagship example of Internet disintermediation. Dell sells its
computers directly to consumers through its website and bypasses distributors or retailers.
See John Pletz, Dell Changed Industry with Direct Sales, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, May 3,
2004, at D1. However, Dell has recently reintermediated by selling some computers through
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Even so, the Internet - and, in particular, the expansion of in-
formation flowing over the network - has also reinforced consumers'
need for intermediaries to manage the data tsunami.75 As a result, the
Internet has spawned a group of powerful new intermediaries who
order and index content for consumers,76 including search engines,
shopbots, 77 and consumer review websites 78 (collectively, "online
intermediaries").
These intermediaries play a major role in facilitating commerce,
both online and off. About three quarters of all online transactions
start at search engines, 79 and many online searches result in offline
purchases.8°
As a result, just as retailers sit between manufacturers and con-
sumers in the distribution chain, online intermediaries now effectively
Wal-Mart. Matt Richtel, Coming Soon to Wal-Mart: 2 Low-End PCs from Dell, N.Y.
TIMES, May 25, 2007, at C4.
75. See Eric Goldman, Search Engine Bias and the Demise of Search Engine Utopianism,
8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 188 (2006); Mitra Barun Sarkar et al., Intermediaries and Cybermedi-
aries: A Continuing Role for Mediating Players in the Electronic Marketplace, J.
COMPUTER MEDIATED COMMC'NS, Dec. 1995, http://jcmc.indiana.edu/voll/issue3
/sarkar.html.
76. See Frank Pasquale, Copyright in an Era of Information Overload: Toward the Privi-
leging of Categorizers, 60 VAND. L. REV. 135, 136-37 (2007).
77. "Shopbots" are websites that aggregate retailer product/price offers and present those
offers for users to compare retailers. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Shaping Competition on
the Internet: Who Owns Product and Pricing Information?, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1965, 1970
(2000); Michael D. Smith, The Impact of Shopbots on Electronic Markets, 30 J. ACAD.
MARKETING Sci. 446 (2002). Shopbots are sometimes referred to as "comparison shopping
engines" or "comparison engines." Examples of shopbots include Shopping.com, Shop-
zilla/BizRate and MySimon. Stereotypically, shopbots are thought to gather retailer offers
from retailers automatically and without permission. In reality, because the shopbots want to
be paid by the retailers for referring customers, most shopbots enter into agreements with
retailers that may include the retailers regularly providing updated "feeds" of merchant
offers. See Smith, supra, at 451.
78. Prominent consumer review sites include Amazon (which is also an online retailer),
Epinions.com (which is part of Shopping.com/eBay and also acts as a shopbot), and
Yelp.com.
79. See Melanie Mitchell, Handling Search Marketing in Large Organizations, SEARCH
ENGINE WATCH, May 8, 2007, http://searchenginewatch.com/3625800. A 2007 Avenue
A/Razorfish study found a lower percent but still reinforced the trend:
[T]he biggest shift for retailers is yet to come, as their relationship
with consumers appears to be increasingly disintermediated. 54% of
today's connected consumers start their shopping experience at a
general search engine, such as Google... , versus 30% who either
visit the Web site of an established retail store (e.g., Crate & Barrel)
or a specific eCommerce site such as Amazon.com.
Posting of Garrick Schmitt to FEED: The Digital Design Blog, Digital Consumer Behavior
Study, http://www.digitaldesignblog.com/2007/09/28/digital-consumer-behavior-study/
(Sept. 28, 2007).
80. comScore Networks, From Search to Sale, IMEDIA CONNECTION, Dec. 16, 2004,
http://www.imediaconnection.com/content/4801.asp (noting that after consumers searched
for consumer electronics or computers at a search engine, 92% of subsequent purchases
made by those consumers were made offline).
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sit between consumers and retailers in that chain.81 As reintermedia-
tion takes place, retailers become increasingly dependent on online
intermediaries for access to online customers. s2 In effect, by obtaining
frontline control over shoppers, online intermediaries have partially
usurped retailers' preeminent consumer-facing role in the distribution
chain.
But online intermediaries are not merely battling retailers for
"control" over consumers in the distribution chain. Instead, online
intermediaries increasingly perform many of the same functions tradi-
tionally performed by retailers,8 3 making it harder to legally distin-
guish between retailers and online intermediaries.
Consider the similarities between Google and retailers as de-
scribed in Part II. After a consumer submits a keyword search to
Google's general purpose search engine, 84 Google presents the con-
sumer with advertisements that reflect the consumer's past search in-
85 86teractions with Google,s5 the consumer's location, and Google's
other assessments of relevancy. 87 From a consumer perspective, the
brand-triggered ads are analogous to a retail salesperson informing the
consumer that competitive choices exist. They also replicate the ex-
perience of consumers learning about competitive options from the
side-by-side in-store display of competitive products.
With this additional information, consumers can then navigate
through the search results and ads to do comparison shopping.88Google even helps consumers purchase items from a third-party re-
81. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, Just Googling It Is Striking Fear into Companies, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 6, 2005, § 1, at 1.
82. See JoHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH 153-57 (2005) (discussing the challenges experi-
enced by Neil Moncrief, operator of 2bigfeet.com, after it was removed from Google right
before the holiday shopping season); Lohr, supra note 81 (discussing how search engines
will force car dealers to change the services they provide to consumers); Michael Totty &
Mylene Mangalindan, As Google Becomes Web's Gatekeeper, Sites Fight To Get In, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 26, 2003, at Al (discussing how a retailer's sales dropped 80% after having its
ranking reduced in Google).
83. See Sarkar et al., supra note 75; Kevin Lee, Paying for Shelf Space in the Search Su-
permarket, CLICKZ, Sept. 1, 2006, http://www.clickz.com/3623308 (analogizing search
engine keyword ads to manufacturers paying slotting fees).
84. Google's shopbot, Google Product Search, is even more analogous to a retailer. See
Google Product Search, http://www.google.com/products (last visited May 15, 2009).
85. See Zachary Rodgers, Google Targets Search Ads on Prior Queries, ,6 la Behavioral,
CLIcKZ, July 31, 2007, http://www.clickz.com/3626593.
86. See Google, Targeting by Location - AdWords Help, http://adwords.google.com/
select/targeting.html (last visited May 15, 2009).
87. See Google, How Are Ads Ranked?, http://adwords.google.com/support/bin/answer.
py?answer=6111&topic=l15 (last visited May 15, 2009) (discussing Google's "Quality
Score" for "Ad Rank").
88. See Gord Hotchkiss, Tales of Pogo Sticks, Bouncy SERPs and Sticky Pages, SEARCH
ENGINE GUIDE, Sept. 11, 2006, http://www.searchengineguide.com/gord-hotchkiss/tales-of-
pogo-s.php (explaining that about one in two searches involve pogo-sticking where the
searcher checks out an individual search result and returns back to the search results list).
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tailer by accepting and processing the consumer's payment through its
"Checkout" service.
89
When consumers follow this process completely, Google has, in
practice, displaced the retailer in these sales. True, third-party retailers
technically make the ultimate sale, but Google has controlled all of
the meaningful facets of the consumer experience - just as a retailer
would control the experience offline.
Google is not the only online intermediary tacitly displacing re-
tailers. Amazon and eBay have become major marketplaces for inde-
pendent vendors by offering many services normally provided by
traditional retailers. 90 Similarly, shopbots offer their own "shopping
cart" technology, allowing a consumer to consummate transactions
with third-party retailers through the shopbot's system.91 It is probable
that in the future online intermediaries increasingly will capitalize on
their preeminent relationship with consumers to perform the functions
traditionally performed by retailers and will thereby displace retailers
in the chain.
B. Online Intermediaries Face More Trademark Liability than
Retailers Do
The previous Section depicted online intermediaries as the new
equivalent of retailers in the distribution chain. Given their highly
similar functions, it seems logical to assume that trademark law would
treat online intermediaries just like retailers when engaging in profit-
maximizing capitalization of brand spillovers - that is, as it does
with retailers, trademark law would largely ignore the behavior of
online intermediaries.
This assumption is incorrect. Retailers and online intermediaries
are not treated the same. Most obviously, trademark owners routinely
sue online intermediaries (especially search engines) for profiting
from brand spillovers. Many of these lawsuits have focused on key-
word triggering, the intermediary's sale of the plaintiffs trademark as
a keyword to trigger competitive advertising,92 but trademark lawsuits
also have been directed at eBay,93 consumer review sites,94 and others.
89. Google Checkout, http://checkout.google.com (last visited May 15, 2009).
90. See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (hold-
ing that eBay is more like an offiine swap meet than an advertising venue); Corbis Corp. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1094-95 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (discussing some of
the services that Amazon provides to its third-party zShops vendors).
91. Comparison Shopping Engine Strategies, A Look at Shopping.com's New Checkout
System, http://www.csestrategies.com/cse/2006/1 1/a look at shopp.html (Nov. 7, 2006).
92. For an aggregation of the cases that have reached some judicial resolution, see Gold-
man, supra note 3.
93. See, e.g., Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 463.
[Vol. 22
HeinOnline -- 22 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 400 2008-2009
No. 2] Brand Spillovers
While these lawsuits against online intermediaries generally have
not yet resulted in final adverse trademark rulings in the United
States,95 there are several trademark-related efforts to regulate online
intermediaries more extensively than retailers.
First, in the United States, courts have fractured on the appropri-
ate legal resolution of online brand spillover cases, and numerous
courts have rendered adverse interim judgments that raise serious le-
gal doubts about the legal state of keyword triggering specifically and
brand spillover activity online generally.96 Indeed, to try to preemp-
tively minimize their liability, some online intermediaries have "vol-
untarily" adopted trademark policies to give trademark owners an
extra-judicial recourse to stop certain types of brand spillovers.97
Second, Alaska and Utah have banned online intermediaries from
engaging in keyword triggering in certain contexts. Utah actually
passed two separate laws banning keyword triggering. The Utah Spy-
ware Control Act, which was enacted in 200498 and amended (and
substantially narrowed) in 2005,99 restricted keyword triggering via
94. See, e.g., Complaint, Lifestyle Lift Holding, Inc. v. Real Self Inc., No. 2:08-cv-10089
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 7, 2008), available at http://www.realself.com/files/complaint-from-
Lifestyle-Lift-Holdings.pdf.
95. See Goldman, supra note 3. But see Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive Co. v.
Gator Corp., No. Civ.A.02-909-A, 2002 WL 31356645 (E.D. Va. July 16, 2002), where the
court issued a preliminary injunction against an adware vendor engaged in keyword trigger-
ing, but the order itself provided no explanation, and the court never reached the question of
a final injunction.
96. To be clear, other courts have completely absolved online intermediaries from trade-
mark liability for their brand spillover activities. See Goldman, supra note 3.
97. See, e.g., Google, AdWords Trademark Complaint Procedure, http://www.google.
com/tmcomplaint adwords.html (last visited May 15, 2009); Google, AdSense for Do-
mains Trademark Complaint Procedure, http://www.google.com/tm-complaint afd.htm
(last visited May 15, 2009); Microsoft adCenter Trademark Policy, http://advertising.
microsoft.com/Home/Article.aspx?pageid=708&AdvArticleid=3216 (last visited May 15,
2009); Legal Guidelines from Yahoo! Search Marketing, http://searchmarketing.
yahoo.com/legal/trademarks.php (last visited May 15, 2009).
While the major search engines have all adopted this type of policy, no court has blessed
the idea that such policies preclude trademark liability. Indeed, in one court, a domainer's
voluntarily adopted trademark policy did not eliminate its cybersquatting liability. Verizon
Cal. Inc. v. Navigation Catalyst Sys., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
Further, the search engine trademark policies may block activities that are otherwise
permissible under trademark law. See, e.g., Chris Soghoian, Google Censors Political-
Donation Transparency Ads, CNET NEWS, Dec. 17, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-
13739_3-10122713-46.html.
98. 2004 Utah Laws 1679 (codified as amended at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-40-101 to
-401 (2008)). The statute prohibited adware from displaying pop-up advertising triggered
in response to a third party trademark. Id.
99. Spyware Control Act Revisions, 2005 Utah Laws 1132 (codified at UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 13-40-102 to -302); see Posting of Eric Goldman to Technology & Marketing Law Blog,
Utah Amends Spyware Control Act, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2005/03/
utah-amends-spy.htm (Mar. 22, 2005). Among other changes, the amendments required
plaintiffs to show that the trademark triggering constituted trademark infringement, thus
making this cause of action effectively redundant with a trademark infringement claim. Id.
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adware. 100 Then, in 2007, Utah passed the Trademark Protection
Act, 1 1 which categorically restricted competitive keyword triggering
regardless of technology. However, in 2008, Utah rescinded the main
operative provisions of the Trademark Protection Act. l°2 Meanwhile,
in 2005, Alaska passed an anti-adware law that resembled the 2004
version of the Utah Spyware Control Act but had its own idiosyncra-
sies. 103 It remains very possible that other states beyond Alaska and
Utah will explore ways to regulate keyword triggering.
Third, internationally, some countries have had adverse legal re-
actions to online intermediaries' brand spillover activities. Most
notable is France, where courts have repeatedly ruled against
Google's keyword triggering practices.1
0 5
While the ultimate legal resolution of online brand spillovers re-
mains a work-in-progress, it is clear that at least some courts, legisla-
tures, trademark owners, and commentators think profiting from
brand spillovers by online intermediaries should be treated differently
than such profiting by retailers. The next Part will try to explain these
differences.
100. Adware is client-side software that monitors a user's behavior and delivers advertis-
ing putatively associated with that behavior, including in some cases using trademarks (such
as when a user submits a trademark to a search engine or inputs a trademarked domain name
into his address bar) to trigger advertising. See generally Eric Goldman, A Coasean Analysis
of Marketing, 2006 WIS. L. REv. 1151,1211-13 (defining and discussing adware).
101. 2007 Utah Laws 2215 (codified as amended in scattered sections of UTAH CODE
ANN. tit. 70, ch. 3a).
102. Act of Mar. 17, 2008, 2008 Utah Laws 1676 (codified in scattered sections of UTAH
CODE ANN. tit. 70, ch. 3a); see Posting of Eric Goldman to Technology & Marketing Law
Blog, supra note 70. In Spring 2009, Utah considered yet another attempt to regulate key-
word advertising, but that law did not pass. Posting of Eric Goldman to Technology & Mar-
keting Law Blog, Utah lB 450 Dies in Utah Senate Without a Vote,
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/03/utah hb 450 die.htm (Mar. 13, 2009).
103. Act of Sept. 1, 2005, 2005 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 97, § 3 (codified at ALASKA STAT.
§§ 45.45.792-.798 (2008)); see Posting of Eric Goldman to Technology & Marketing Law
Blog, Alaska's Anti-Adware Law, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2005/06/
alaskas antiadw.htm (June 22, 2005). Unlike the Utah law, adware users could consent to
the trademark-triggered pop-up ads, although it is not clear from the statute how the adware
vendor can properly obtain user consent.
104. See Stephan Ott, Links & Law - Google's Ad Words Under Attack,
http://www.linksandlaw.com/adwords-pendinglawsuits.htm (last visited May 15, 2009)
(enumerating many keyword triggering decisions worldwide); Google, Inc., Annual Report
(Form 10-K), at 24 (Dec. 31, 2007).
The caselaw is mixed worldwide, and some countries have adopted rulings that appear to
permit keyword triggering. See, e.g., CC (TA) 000506/06 Matim Li v. Crazy Line, slip op.
[2006] (on file with author) (suggesting that search engines may not face trademark liability
in Israel); Wilson v. Yahoo! UK Ltd. [2008] EWHC 361 No. 1HC 710/07 (Ch.) (suggesting
that search engines may not face trademark liability in England).
105. See Stephan Ott, Links & Law - Adwords Lawsuits in France,
http://www.linksandlaw.com/adwords-google-keyword-lawsuit-France.htm (last visited
May 15, 2009); BNA's E-Commerce & Tech Law Blog, Google AdWords Beats Trademark
Claim in France, but Loses on Two Other Issues, http://pblog.bna.com/techlaw/2009/02/
google-adwords-in-france-.html (Feb. 3, 2009).
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IV. OPTIMIZING TRADEMARK LAW FOR INTERMEDIARIES
As Part III explained, trademark law appears to treat retailers and
online intermediaries differently regarding their efforts to profit from
brand spillovers. This Part tries to rationalize this dichotomy.
A. Hypotheses to Explain Why Retailers and Online Intermediaries
Are Treated Differently
There are multiple plausible explanations for the retailer/online
intermediary dichotomy. This Section reviews some of those explana-
tions:
1. Hypothesis #1: Spillovers in Every Direction
In some cases, retailer-created spillovers benefit trademark own-
ers. For example, Coca-Cola might feel like retailers are taking unfair
advantage of its brand when retailers advertise a Coca-Cola product as
a loss leader to stimulate sales of third-party products. 0 6 At the same
time, Coca-Cola might get positive spillovers from retailers' other
retailing practices, such as a retailer's promotion of "Rum and Coke"
that might generate new incremental profits for both the retailer and
Coca-Cola. As a result, any individual manufacturer may not know if
a retailer's practices are, on balance, net positive or negative for it.
Due to this opacity and the possibility that they get more than they
give, manufacturers might tolerate retailer-created spillovers.
However, this hypothesis does not adequately explain why manu-
facturers do not sue retailers for spillovers unfavorable to the manu-
facturers. Even if the net spillover effects were indeterminate,
trademark owners nevertheless would have incentives to try to block
disadvantageous spillovers using their brands while retaining any pos-
itive ones (i.e., Coca-Cola could try to stop the loss leader usage but
leave the "Rum and Coke" merchandising alone).
Further, this hypothesis does not explain the online intermedi-
ary/retailer dichotomy. Spillovers can flow in every direction online,
just as they do offline. Numerous keyword triggering plaintiffs also
bought keyword ads on third-party trademarks "7 - thus taking ad-
106. Soft drinks are a common loss leader. See David Wellman, Incremental Bubbles,
SUPERMARKET BUS., Nov. 15, 1999, at 41, 41.
107. E.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 409 n.12 (2d Cir.
2005) (1-800 Contacts had purchased keyword ads from adware vendors); Google Inc. v.
Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-5340 IF (RS), 2007 WL 1848665 (N.D.
Cal. June 27, 2007) (American Blinds purchased competitors' keywords); Buying for the
Home, LLC v. Humble Abode, LLC, 459 F. Supp. 2d 310 (D.N.J. 2006) (both plaintiff and
defendant had bought each other's trademarks as keywords). Indeed, when Utah passed the
Utah Trademark Protection Act to outlaw keyword triggering, local Utah companies 1-800
No. 2]
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vantage of the spillovers that they were simultaneously trying to stop.
Therefore, if trademark owners have tolerated the bi-directional flow
of spillovers in the offline context, it is not clear why the bi-
directional flow would become unacceptable online.
2. Hypothesis #2: No Actual Spillovers
Another possibility is that the putative retailer-created brand spil-
lovers discussed in Part II are not actually spillovers because manu-
facturers set their prices to internalize any positive spillovers. Thus, if
a manufacturer believes that its trademarks are generating brand spill-
overs for retailers, the manufacturer can increase its price to capture
this benefit.
Some evidence supports this hypothesis. Retailers generally earn
lower margins on items with strong consumer brands'0 8 because re-
tailers generally have little discretion about these brands; consumers
may not patronize a retailer that does not carry their preferred
brand. 109 Accordingly, a retailer often pays a relative premium to car-
ry these items, and this premium may pass through any spillovers
these brands can generate for the retailers. Also, some manufacturers
produce both a category-leading branded product and the retailer's
house brand,110 a form of price discrimination that lets the manufac-
turer charge more for the spillover-producing product.
Further, this hypothesis may help explain the retailer/online in-
termediary dichotomy. Manufacturers and retailers are in contractual
privity (although privity may be indirect due to the distribution chain),
which allows manufacturers to set prices that internalize spillovers. In
contrast, manufacturers typically lack privity with online intermediar-
ies and thus lack a financial mechanism to recoup any spillovers from
these intermediaries.
At the same time, manufacturers face numerous challenges setting
prices accurately enough to internalize retailer spillovers. First, manu-
facturers may sell through a multi-tier chain of distribution, which
Contacts and Overstock.com protested the law because they did not want to lose their ability
to buy their competitors' trademarks - even though both had previously brought lawsuits
to stop keyword triggering. See Linda Fantin, Lawmakers Could Rethink Online Registry,
SALT LAKE TRit., Apr. 26, 2007, at Local.
108. See Lynch, supra note 8, at 928.
109. See Klein & Wright, supra note 8, at 434; Jerre B. Swann, Sr. et al, Trademarks and
Marketing, 91 TRADEMARK REP. 787, 810 (2001) ("Strong brands... can provide manufac-
turers with a bargaining chip in the 'channel' game. Loyal customers generate 'pull' for the
brand: if a retailer does not stock what they are looking for, consumers will be unhappy.").
110. See Ellen Byron, 101 Brand Names, 1 Manufacturer, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2007, at
BI ("In many cases, the maker of a brand-name product will also produce private-label
versions."); see also Fremont Co. v. T Cont'l Baking Co., No. 76 Civ. 5728, 1977 WL
22763, at *420 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 1977). See generally Coleman, supra note 40 (examin-
ing the role of "private label products" in the marketplace).
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reduces their ability to dictate the price that retailers actually pay.11
Second, manufacturers cannot completely control their distribution
channels, so goods can "leak" out of a distribution chain at prices that
do not internalize the spillovers.1 2 Third, manufacturers have a diffi-
cult time accurately determining the internalizing price given the mul-
titudinous ways in which retailers can create brand spillovers. Finally,
laws restricting the ability of manufacturers to price discriminate, like
the Robinson-Patman Act, may further hinder manufacturer price set-
ting.1
3
While the hypothesis that manufacturers set prices to prevent re-
tailer spillovers does help explain the dichotomy, treating it as a com-
plete explanation requires a high - and perhaps unrealistic -
confidence in marketplace price-setting mechanisms.
3. Hypothesis #3: Manufacturers Are Reluctant to Sue Retailers"
14
Another possible explanation for the dichotomy is that manufac-
turers prefer not to sue retailers." 5 There are several reasons why this
might be the case.
First, other defendants may be more attractive targets. If a con-
tract manufacturer makes "knockoff" house brands for multiple retail-
ers, the trademark owner might prefer to sue the manufacturer because
a victory over the manufacturer can be more efficient than pursuing
each individual retailer. However, because the trademark analysis
11. When a downstream distributor sets the retailer's actual price, it may not internalize
all of the retailer's spillover benefits. Of course, a manufacturer could set its price to dis-
tributors to recoup all manufacturing costs and internalize all retailer spillovers.
112. In fact, recently there has been a spate of lawsuits against online retailers based on
goods that have leaked out of manufacturers' intended distribution chains and thereby
eroded manufacturers' price controls. E.g., Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228
(10th Cir. 2006); Mary Kay, Inc. v. Weber, No. 3:08-CV-0776-G, 2009 WL 426470 (N.D.
Tex. Feb. 20, 2009); Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008);
Standard Process, Inc. v. Total Health Disc., Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 932 (E.D. Wis. 2008);
Designer Skin, LLC v. S & L Vitamins, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 2d 811 (D. Ariz. 2008); Standard
Process, Inc. v. Banks, 554 F. Supp. 2d 866 (E.D. Wis. 2008); S&L Vitamins, Inc. v. Aus-
tralian Gold, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d 188 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 13-13a (2006).
114. This could be characterized as a subset of the broader risks associated with suing
customers. See, e.g., G. Richard Shell, Suing Your Customers: A Winning Business Strat-
egy?, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, Oct. 22, 2003, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/
article.cfm?articleid=863.
115. See Colleen Collins-Dodd & Judith L. Zaichkowsky, National Brand Responses to
Brandlmitation: Retailers Versus Other Manufacturers, 8 J. PROD. & BRAND MGMT. 96, 96
(1999); see also McKeon Prods., Inc. v. Flents Prods. Co., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1032,
1033-34 n.2 (E.D. Mich. 2003) ("[I]t is packaging selected by the retailers Walgreens and
Albertson's which is the subject of this case. While the Court is not basing its decision
solely on this point, the Court is troubled that Walgreens and Albertson's - the entities that
purportedly selected the trade dress at issue - are not Defendants in this litigation. While
the Court understands the reasons for McKeon's desire not to sue its own customers, the
Court is nonetheless bothered by their absence from this litigation.").
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may depend on the specifics of each retailer's implementation, trade-
mark owners cannot simply ignore retailers. 116 Plus, trademark own-
ers could simply sue manufacturers and retailers jointly.
Second, manufacturers might prefer not to sue retailers because
retailers control their access to consumers, and manufacturers may
fear that retailer-defendants will cut off that access. 117 This reasoning
could explain why we see so few manufacturer-v.-retailer trademark
lawsuits. If retailers have significant leverage over manufacturers -
which they do' 8 - manufacturers have good reason to be nervous
about suing retailers.
This explanation is not completely satisfactory. Even though re-
tailers as a class are powerful- and some retailers (like Wal-Mart
and Costco) have overwhelming leverage over manufacturers -
manufacturers could still sue weak individual retailers, such as low-
volume and mom-and-pop retailers.1 9 Further, manufacturers do sue
retailers, such as when retailers' house brands are too close to manu-
facturers' brands.
120
Moreover, even if manufacturers avoid suing retailers, this does
not fully explain the retailer/online intermediary dichotomy. As ex-
plained earlier, online intermediaries are the new power brokers in the
distribution chain, and manufacturers do not want to risk retaliation by
online intermediaries that could vindictively cut off consumer ac-
cess. 12 1 Perhaps manufacturers believe that online intermediaries have
116. E.g., Johnson & Johnson v. Actavis Group hf, No. 06 Civ. 8209(DLC), 2008 WL
228061 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2008) (refusing summary judgment against contract manufac-
turer because the court had to consider the facts applicable to each of the defendant's re-
tailer-customers).
117. See Pan Demetrakakes, Private-Label Copycats Rankle Big Brands, PACKAGING,
June 1993, at 37, 37 ("[Miany of the look-alike store-brand packages are put out by major
retailers, who have clout that other competitors don't have: the ability to deny shelf space to
national brands that get too assertive in defending their trade-dress rights.").
118. See Hitt, supra note 18 (discussing how Universal Product Codes (UPCs) and scan-
ners have shifted power from manufacturers to retailers by increasing retailer knowledge
about sales activity); Bob Tedeschi, Manufacturers Find Ways to Navigate Web Retailing,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2007, at C4 (discussing how some manufacturers are wary of compet-
ing directly with retailers by selling their products direct-to-consumers via the web).
119. Such lawsuits may be less attractive to manufacturers because low-volume retailers,
by definition, do not engage in as many spillover activities as larger retailers, and low-
volume retailers may be less financially solvent as well.
120. Cf supra Part IUC.
121. See Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness
and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1149, 1167 (2008); cf Do-
reen Carvajal, Small Publishers Feel Power of Amazon's 'Buy' Button, N.Y. TIMES, June
16, 2008, at C7 (relating how Amazon penalized publishers who did not accede to Ama-
zon's preferred revenue splits by removing the "buy" button for those products, making it
harder for consumers to actually purchase the books and disabling the books' eligibility for
free shipping).
For example, there is some evidence that Google advertisers get help obtaining enhanced
placement in search results. See Scott Buresh, Google 's Paid Search vs. Organic Results -
A Rickety Wall of Separation, SEARCH ENGINE GUIDE, Nov. 13, 2007, http://www.
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more "editorial integrity" than retailers and thus are less likely to en-
gage in manufacturer-specific retribution. Nevertheless, online inter-
mediaries can and do make individualized and subjective judgments
about their intermediation. 122 Thus, manufacturers should be as nerv-
ous about suing online intermediaries as they are about suing retailers.
4. Hypothesis #4: Retailers and Online Intermediaries Have Legally
Significant Differences
This hypothesis is that existing trademark law may permit retail-
ers' brand spillover activities but not permit the activities of online
intermediaries. 1
23
The First Sale Doctrine
Some retailer brand spillover activities are protected under the
first sale doctrine, whereas online intermediaries' analogous activities
are not. The first sale doctrine (also called the trademark exhaustion
doctrine) prevents a trademark owner from restricting the resale of
legitimately acquired goods. 24 The first sale doctrine also allows re-
tailers to advertise the goods they sell, so retailers can advertise
branded products as loss leaders even if that advertising actually re-
sults in the sale of competitive goods.
In contrast, online intermediaries cannot assert a first sale defense
for brand spillovers when they do not vend the advertised goods
themselves. Nor can an online intermediary's advertisers claim the
first sale doctrine when they buy keywords using competitors' brands
but do not actually resell the competitors' goods. Accordingly, the
first sale doctrine might explain some aspects of the retailer/online
intermediary dichotomy.
However, online intermediaries benefit from the printer/publisher
limit on remedies, 125 which loosely parallels first sale protection for
retailers. The printer/publisher defense says that an innocent printer or
publisher of third-party content or ads (including online printers and
searchengineguide.com/scott-buresh/googles-paid-search-vs-organic-results-a.php. Many
manufacturers would not want to risk access to such help.
122. See Goldman, supra note 75; Randall Stross, The Human Touch That May Loosen
Google's Grip, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2007, at BU3; Saul Hansell, Inside the Black Box,
N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2007, § 3, at 1; Matt Cutts: Gadgets, Google, and SEO, The Role of
Humans in Google Search, http://www.mattcutts.com/blog/the-role-of-humans-in-google-
search/ (June 23, 2007); Andrew Orlowski, Google Cranks Up the Consensus Engine,
REGISTER, Dec. 12, 2008, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/12/12/googlewashing_
revisited/.
123. Part IV.B infra will advocate for harmonized legal treatment.
124. Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 359 (1924); Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Longs
Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 1995); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 50, § 25:43.
125. Lanham Act § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2) (2006).
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publishers) is liable only for a future injunction, not damages for past
infringements. 126 While the doctrine does not completely eliminate an
online intermediary's liability for brand spillovers, the limit on reme-
dies ought to discourage some lawsuits.
Instead, the printer/publisher limit on remedies apparently has not
deterred some trademark owners, perhaps because no one is sure how
the doctrine applies in the online context. 127 Further, the doctrine only
protects "innocent" infringers, and based on differing moral norms
about capitalizing on positive externalities,' 28 some judges may view
brand spillover activities as categorically culpable. Therefore, it re-
mains to be seen whether the printer/publisher doctrine helps online
intermediaries as much as the first sale doctrine protects retailers that
take advantage of brand spillovers.
Use in Commerce
Retailers' brand spillover activities also may not qualify as a "use
in commerce" of manufacturer trademarks, while online intermediar-
ies' activities might. The Lanham Act only applies when a defendant
makes a "use in commerce" of a third-party trademark "in connection
with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any
goods or services. ' 129 The "use in commerce" requirement has led to
confused jurisprudence for online intermediaries 130 for good reason.
The Lanham Act has two possibly conflicting definitions:
126. Id.
127. In addition to other ambiguities, the doctrine lacks much interpretive precedent. On
July 19, 2008, I searched in Westlaw's ALLCASES database for "1114(2) /p trademark/s
(printer publisher)" and got fewer than ten different cases citing the statute, only some of
which relate to online litigation.
128. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83
TEx. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (2005).
129. 15 U.S.C. § 11 14(l)(a) (registered marks); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (unregis-
tered marks); 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 410-11 (2005).
130. See Eric Goldman, Online Word of Mouth and Its Implications for Trademark Law,
in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 404,
414-24 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008); see also Graeme B. Din-
woodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA
L. REv. 1597, 1609-14 (2007); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Lessons from the
Trademark Use Debate, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1703, 1706-08 (2007); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark
A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REv. 1669,
1676 (2007).
There have been numerous other articles exploring the problems with the "use in com-
merce" provision, in some cases addressing the online intermediary issue. See, e.g., Mar-
greth Barrett, Finding Trademark Use: The Historical Foundation for Limiting Infringement
Liability to Uses "In the Manner of a Mark," 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 893, 897 (2008);
Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of "Trademark Use," 39 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 371, 382 (2006); Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Use and the Problem of
Source in Trademark Law, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 773; Uli Widmaier, Use, Liability, and the
Structure of Trademark Law, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 603 (2004).
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1. A definition of "commerce" that tracks the constitutional defi-
nition under the Commerce Clause. This defnition effectively elimi-
nates the "use in commerce" element of the plaintiff's prima facie
case,131 with the logical consequence that keyword advertising should
always constitute a "use in commerce."
2. A definition of "use in commerce" that implicitly requires con-
sumers to see the trademark being used.132 Under this definition, key-
word advertising would not satisfy the standard if the advertiser's ad
copy does not mention the trademark.
Because the statute does not provide adequate guidance for courts
to choose between the two definitions, "courts have irreconcilably
split" about whether keyword advertising constitutes "use in com-
merce."1 33 As the Second Circuit recently said, "[i]t would be helpful
for Congress to study and clear up this ambiguity."
134
If the "commerce" definition applies, it may not explain the re-
tailer/online intermediary dichotomy because some retailers' brand
spillover activities ought to qualify as a "use in commerce." For ex-
ample, retailers invisibly "use" manufacturer trademarks when they
deliberately create shelf adjacencies, knowing that a manufacturer's
trademark will draw customers to third-party goods - much like the
way online intermediaries create "virtual" adjacencies by displaying
third-party ads to consumers "drawn" to a manufacturer's trademark.
Yet, no court has deemed shelf space adjacency a use in commerce, 135
while numerous courts have said that "invisible" keyword triggering
is a trademark use in commerce. 136 Accordingly, the "use in com-
merce" doctrinal analysis does not explain the dichotomy.
131. The definition of "commerce" is "all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by
Congress." 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Under this definition, the Lanham Act's scope is co-extensive
with Congress's Commerce Clause powers, and Congress can regulate virtually anything
related to the Internet under the Commerce Clause.
132. See id.; Goldman, supra note 130, at 421.
133. Goldman, supra note 130, at 428; Goldman, supra note 3 (showing that there are
about equal numbers of cases supporting each interpretation).
134. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., No. 06-4881-cv, 2009 WL 875447, at *16 (2d Cir.
Apr. 3, 2009).
135. Cf id at *6 ("It is not by reason of absence of a use of a mark in commerce that be-
nign product placement escapes liability; it escapes liability because it is a benign practice
which does not cause a likelihood of consumer confusion.").
136. See id. at *4; Hearts on Fire Co. v. Blue Nile, Inc., No. 08cv11053-NG, 2009 WL
794482, at *1 (D. Mass. Mar. 27, 2009); Market Am. v. Optihealth Prods., Inc., No.
1:07CV00855, 2008 WL 5069802, at *6 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 21, 2008); Hysitron Inc. v. MTS
Sys. Corp., No. CIV 07-01533 ADM/AJB, 2008 WL 3161969, at *3 (D. Minn. Aug. 1,
2008); Fin. Express LLC v. Nowcom Corp., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1173 (C.D. Cal. 2008);
T.D.I. Int'l, Inc. v. Golf Pres., Inc., No. 6:07-313-DCR, 2008 WL 294531 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 31,
2008); Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 527 F. Supp. 2d 205, 207 (D.
Mass. 2007); J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C. Ltd. P'ship v. Settlement Funding LLC, No. 06-0597,
2007 WL 30115, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007); Buying for the Home, LLC v. Humble Ab-
ode, LLC, 459 F. Supp. 2d 310, 323 (D.N.J. 2006); 800-JR Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc.,
437 F. Supp. 2d 273, 285 (D.N.J. 2006); Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, No. Civ.
04-4371JRTFLN, 2006 WL 737064, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2006); Rescuecom Corp. v.
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No Consumer Confusion
Consumer confusion is a central requirement of trademark in-
fringement, and another possible explanation for the dichotomy is that
consumers are confused by online brand spillovers but not retailer
spillovers. This explanation has some support. When consumers en-
counter competitive options bearing distinguishable brands on the
same store shelf, consumers choosing between the options should be
able to understand the relative relationship between the two products.
In contrast, consumers may not clearly understand technological ac-
tivities like keyword triggering.
37
However, even if consumers do not understand why they are see-
ing a keyword-triggered ad, they may still be clear about the relation-
ship between the various brands - especially when the advertiser's
ad copy displays its own brand. 13 In that circumstance, the consumers
are presented with information about competing brands among which
they can select, just like the side-by-side retail shelf presentation of
competing brands. However, even without that display, we should not
automatically assume consumer confusion. 39 Further, as I will dis-
cuss below, there is no reason to believe that consumers have a clearer
understanding of retailing practices than of online intermediation.
Computer Troubleshooters USA, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1266-67 (N.D. Ga. 2005);
GEICO v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 703 (E.D. Va. 2004).
If the ad copy displays the manufacturer's trademark, then courts agree that the trade-
mark display is a trademark "use in commerce." E.g., Hamzik v. Zale Corp./Del., No. 3:06-
cv-1300, 2007 WL 1174863, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2007) (holding that third-party
trademark reference in ad copy is a trademark use in commerce, even if using the trademark
as a keyword trigger - without more - is not).
137. In two of the leading keyword triggering cases, plaintiffs introduced evidence that
consumers did not understand the keyword triggering process. In the 2003 1-800 Contacts v.
When U.com case, the plaintiff introduced survey evidence that a majority of surveyed con-
sumers mistakenly thought (1) adware-delivered pop-ups were delivered by the underlying
websites, and (2) those websites had prescreened and approved the ads. 309 F. Supp. 2d
467, 499-500 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev'd, 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005). In the 2004 Playboy
Enterprises v. Netscape Communications case, the plaintiff introduced survey evidence that
a majority of searchers for the term "playboy" thought Playboy Enterprises sponsored or
was affiliated with the keyword-triggered third-party ads. 354 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir.
2004). Both surveys were ultimately subject to significant criticism by the courts and given
diminished weight, but directionally they might provide some evidence that consumers did
not understand why they were seeing the material presented to them.
138. Ironically, Google's trademark policy allows trademark owners to block references
to their trademarks in third-party advertisers' ad copy, which arguably may exacerbate any
consumer confusion about the relationship between the advertiser and the trademark owner.
Google, AdWords Trademark Complaint Procedures, supra note 97; see Soghoian, supra
note 97.
139. In a slightly analogous context, consumers had a surprisingly good grasp on ambush
marketing efforts - where a marketer tries to associate itself with a sporting or other live
event without paying to become an official sponsor. Anita M. Moorman & T. Christopher
Greenwell, Consumer Attitudes of Deception and the Legality of Ambush Marketing Prac-
tices, 15 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 183, 203 (2005); see Steve McKelvey, NHL v. Pepsi-
Cola Canada, Uh-Huh! Legal Parameters of Sports Ambush Marketing, ENT. & SPORTS
LAW., Fall 1992, at 5, 5.
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5. Hypothesis #5: Cyberspace Exceptionalism
As this discussion illustrates, the four prior hypotheses each offer
partial explanations of the retailer/online intermediary dichotomy, but
no single hypothesis is fully satisfactory. There remains one other
hypothesis to consider: perhaps the dichotomy is a doctrinal anomaly
that lacks analytical support.
If so, what caused this anomaly? To me, the retailer/online inter-
mediary dichotomy looks like "cyberspace exceptionalism," the de-
velopment of Internet-specific legal rules that treat the Internet as
unique, special, or different from existing media. 14 Sometimes, cy-
berspace exceptionalism reflects bona fide differences between the
Internet and other media; more often, cyberspace exceptionalism is a
factually or logically unsupportable overreaction to exaggerated dif-
ferences.
Keyword triggering seems especially susceptible to cyberspace
exceptionalism. After all, the triggering process is unfamiliar and
poorly understood, which naturally leads to suspicion. Over time,
consumers and judges will better understand keyword triggering tech-
nologies and other online intermediary spillover practices. But for
now, most people probably find it vaguely mysterious.
In contrast, retailers' brand spillover practices have been widely
used for years (and in some cases decades), so superficially they may
seem familiar and "typical" to consumers and judges. Yet, in fact,
consumers often do not actually understand retailers' merchandising
practices any better than they understand keyword triggering,14' either
because the practices are relatively recent or unknown - such as slot-
ting fees and category management - or because consumers simply
do not think about them. As with keyword triggering, certain mer-
chandising innovations have generated some policy angst,142 but they
have not produced the same kind of overt regulatory responses.
Some people may also feel that keyword triggering is inherently
unfair to the trademark owner, especially if they assume that a con-
sumer using a trademarked search term is looking for the trademark
owner. Based on this assumption, a competitor trying to take advan-
tage of the consumer's apparently expressed interest in the trademark
140. Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 210, 210-11 (2007);
H. Brian Holland, In Defense of Online Intermediary Immunity: Facilitating Communities of
Modified Exceptionalism, 56 U. KAN. L. REv. 369, 276 (2008); Posting of Eric Goldman to
Technology & Marketing Law Blog, The Third Wave of Internet Exceptionalism,
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/03/the-third wave.htm (Mar. 11, 2009).
141. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 17, at 1447; Widmaier, supra note 130, at 684-85.
142. For example, the emergence of slotting allowances led to several Congressional
hearings and Federal Trade Commission workshops. FTC, REPORT ON THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION WORKSHOP ON SLOTTINO ALLOWANCES AND OTHER MARKETING PRACTICES
IN THE GROCERY INDUSTRY 1-2 (2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/02/
slottingallowancesreportfinal.pdf.
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owner seems to be "stealing" the customer. 143 However, this assump-
tion is unquestionably incorrect; many consumers entering a trade-
marked search term may not be looking for the trademark owner's
goods or services. 144 As a result, fears about consumer "poaching" are
both factually misguided and exactly the kind of overreaction that
spurs cyberspace exceptionalism.
Even if consumer "poaching" was a bona fide concern, it is hard-
ly a new phenomenon in cyberspace. As described in Part II.A, for
decades, retailers have used third-party trademarks to redirect con-
sumers for their profit (and the profit of other manufacturers) with
negligible response from trademark owners.
The most compelling evidence supporting cyberspace exception-
alism is the absence of trademark challenges to grocery stores' in-
store delivery of trademark-triggered coupons for third-party manu-
facturers. Like keyword triggering, these couponing systems surrepti-
tiously use manufacturers' trademarks to display competitive
advertising to consumers. If the coupons work as intended, they divert
consumers' future purchases from a loyal brand to a competitive inter-
loping brand. Yet, in contrast to keyword triggering, trademark own-
ers and legislatures have seemingly acquiesced to these couponing
systems.145 Why the radically different treatment?
146
This Section has explored several possible explanations for the re-
tailer/online intermediary dichotomy. Each hypothesis helps explain
certain aspects of the dichotomy, but I believe the only fully satisfying
explanation is cyberspace exceptionalism. The next Section explores
ways to rectify the exceptionalism.
143. Utah State Senator Dan Eastman, sponsor of Utah's 2007 anti-keyword triggering
law, describes keyword triggering as a type of corporate identity theft and says that keyword
triggering leads to consumers being "shanghaied" and "carjacked." Posting of Dan Eastman
to The Senate Site, Identity Theft: The Next Generation, http://senatesite.com/blog/2007/
04/identity-theft-next-generation.html (Apr. 5, 2007).
144. Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J.
507, 521-25 (2005) (describing the myriad of possible meanings when a consumer uses a
trademark as a search keyword). In some cases, consumers use the trademark to describe the
class of goods that include the trademark, such as using Kleenex as a proxy for tissues. See
id; Posting of James Grimmelmann to The Laboratorium, Ben Edelman Gets It Wrong on
Utah H.B. 450, http://www.laboratorium.net/archive/2009/03/10/ben-edelmangets-it_
wrongon utah hb_450 (Mar. 10, 2009).
145. See supra note 70.
146. One obvious difference is that the coupon is delivered after the consumer's purchase
of the trademark owner's good. This means that the consumer has already sorted between
marketplace options to some degree, and the transaction is complete. In contrast, the online
intermediary might be diverting a consumer while the transaction is still up for grabs. How-
ever, trademark owners might be even more incensed about the post-purchase delivery
because the coupon is trying to divert future purchases of a consumer who has already dem-
onstrated his interest in the brand.
[Vol. 22
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B. A Harmonized Brand Spillover Law for Intermediaries
This Article assumes that harmonization of brand spillover law
for intermediaries is desirable.147 Given that unwarranted exceptional-
ism towards online brand spillovers seems to explain the re-
tailer/online intermediary dichotomy, how should we correct the
exceptionalism? Should the policy be more like the offline retailer
standard, where taking advantage of brand spillovers does not create
liability, or should it look more like the online standard, which is
veering towards imposing liability?
The answer depends on the way that intermediaries (those mediat-
ing the manufacturer-consumer relationship) contribute to the efficient
functioning of the marketplace. In a world of perfect information and
zero transaction costs, intermediaries should be unnecessary. Manu-
facturers and consumers would deal directly with each other, and nei-
ther would want to compensate an intermediary for facilitating the
match.
However, in a world filled with transaction costs, intermediaries
offer a variety of valuable services to both manufacturers and con-
sumers, such as the ability to accept returns more efficiently than
manufacturers, economies of scale in shipping goods to particular
geographical areas, and local storage of goods that makes products
available on demand.
148
1. Retailers as Search Cost Managers
Retailers also reduce manufacturer-consumer transaction costs by
satisfying the needs of consumer niche markets more cheaply than
manufacturers can. Determining consumer needs is costly; it includes
costs to aggregate data, analyze it, and respond to identified needs.
For manufacturers trying to cater to multiple, diverse, and far-flung
consumer segments, it can be cost-prohibitive to learn and understand
the needs of every consumer niche, especially small niches. In con-
trast, retailers can cater to consumer niches, such as specific geogra-
phies or industries. Additionally, retailers can spread consumer
research costs across multiple manufacturers. As a result, retailers
147. Cf. Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 101 (2007) (advocating harmonized safe harbors across various online IP
claims).
148. Sarkar et al., supra note 75 (stating that intermediary-provided services include
"search and evaluation," "needs assessment and product matching," "customer risk man-
agement," "product distribution," "product information dissemination," "purchase influ-
ence, "provision of customer information," "producer risk management," "transaction
economies of scale," and "integration ofconsumer and producer needs").
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often can learn about and satisfy the needs of consumer niches more
cost-effectively than manufacturers.
149
By understanding the needs of their consumers, retailers can pro-
vide valuable services to these consumers as well. Consumers suffer
from several information problems when trying to make marketplace
decisions, 150 including having too much and too little information.
151
Retailers can use specialized knowledge about their customers' needs
to provide information that will help consumers make decisions, -5
and as retailers do a better job performing this function, they increase
their profits as well. Thus, retailers also add value to the distribution
chain by helping consumers reduce their search costs.'
53
Retailers' taxonomical decisions about where and how to place
products are one of the main ways they help reduce consumer search
costs. 154 Typically, retailers put functionally similar products physi-
cally adjacent to each other, but retailers could - and occasionally
do - use alternative organizational schemes if they are more effec-
tive for consumers. 155
Now, what if retailers could not make taxonomical or other
placement decisions unilaterally, based on their own assessments of
their consumer needs? To see how limited retailer placement discre-
tion could hurt consumers, consider what would happen if trademark
law forced retailers to reduce brand spillovers by using alternative
taxonomies such as the following:
149. Id. ("[R]etail intermediaries implicitly provide information processing services by
aggregating demand information from a variety of local markets.").
150. Vincent-Wayne Mitchell et al., Towards a Conceptual Model of Consumer Confu-
sion, 32 ADVANCES CONSUMER RES. 143, 146 (2005) (proposing a typology of consumer
confusion that includes "similarity confusion," "overload confusion," and "ambiguity con-
fusion").
151. For discussion about consumers' problems with information overload in retail envi-
ronments, see BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE 133 (2004), providing an
interesting example of a retailer who sold more jam by offering six varieties instead of
twenty four. See also Jacob Jacoby et al., Brand Choice Behavior as a Function of Informa-
tion Load, 11 J. MARKETING RES. 63 (1974) (describing an experiment tending to show that
consumers make poorer purchase decisions with more information).
152. Sarkar et al., supra note 75 ("[I]ntermediaries can provide a valuable service by
helping customers determine their needs.").
153. Id.
154. See SOLOMON, supra note 27, at 320 ("If products do not clearly fit into categories
(e.g., is a rug furniture?), consumers' ability to find them or make sense of them may be
diminished."); UNDERHILL, supra note 19, at 203 (noting that product adjacencies are
"about order - coming up with a sensible, logical sequence of products"); WEINBERGER,
supra note 18, at 5-6, 61-62 (explaining, among other things, why physical space retailers
cannot stock the same good in multiple taxonomical nodes).
155. See, e.g., WEINBERGER, supra note 18, at 231-33 (describing a novelty store with no
seeming organization to its offerings); F. Gregory Lastowka, Note, Search Engines, HTML,
and Trademarks: What's the Metafor?, 86 VA. L. REV. 835, 859 (2000) (discussing how a
store could organize its goods by throwing random goods into bins and forcing consumers
to sort through the bins).
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By brand. If trademark owners were concerned about brand adja-
cencies, they could require retailers to segregate their brand from oth-
ers so that brand-loyal consumers could find their products in a single
grouping.
Brand-based organization would not be unprecedented. 56 Music
stores and bookstores often organize their offerings alphabetically by
artist/author name (at least, within broad topical categories); some
clothing retailers establish dedicated areas for clothes from a particu-
lar clothing manufacturer; 157 and art galleries may organize the works
by artist.
Other retailers could adopt a brand-based organizational scheme
to reduce brand spillovers. For example, a grocery store could put all
of the Del Monte-branded products next to each other, followed by
the group of Dole-branded products. A brand-based taxonomy would
ensure that competitive brands are physically segregated, reducing the
risk of diversion between competitive brands.
8
Further, brand-based organization might reduce search costs for
consumers with established brand loyalties who are shopping in un-
familiar stores.' 59 A consumer looking for Coca-Cola could go to the
"C" section rather than searching for the beverages aisle.
On the other hand, brand-based organization would frustrate con-
sumers without brand loyalty. If these consumers did not know any
brands in the product category, where would they start? This organi-
zation would also thwart any consumers who want to compare prod-
156. Gray v. Meijer, Inc., 295 F.3d 641, 644 (6th Cir. 2002) (relating how a grocery store
organized products by source so that house brands were segregated from third-party branded
products.). I am not addressing retailers who carry the product line of a single manufacturer
or a limited handful of manufacturers.
157. Cf AutoZone, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 373 F.3d 786, 790 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that
Radio Shack created "store[s] within a store" organized by manufacturer and incorporating
the manufacturer's brand, such as a "Sprint Communications Store, an RCA Digital Enter-
tainment Center, a Microsoft Information Center, and a Compaq Creative learning center").
158. Gray, 295 F.3d at 650:
As Gray contended, Meijer [the retailer] controlled the placement of
the products, and it chose to put Gray's product with other independ-
ent brands and its own product with other Meijer products. Though
popcorn was in the same basic area, I agree with the district court in
the importance of the placement of the products, as it can naturally be
inferred that if Meijer had sought to confuse and trade-off Gray's
popcorn brand, then it would have placed them side-by-side rather
than surround its popcorn with other Meijer products, which clearly
indicates that all products in that section are Meijer products. As the
district court concluded, "[a] purchaser with even a minimal degree of
care and sophistication would not reasonably believe that the Grays'
[sic] popcorn product was placed alone amidst a sea of Meijer's pri-
vate label products. The placement of the products minimizes the li-
kelihood of confusion between the products. This factor favors
Meijer.
Id.
159. Sixty percent of Staples customers do not know where their desired products are lo-
cated in the store. See WEINBERGER, supra note 18, at 2.
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ucts on price or other attributes. To do so, they would have to traipse
through the store to find comparable items (assuming they knew the
relevant brands), making side-by-side comparison difficult. Consum-
ers buying multiple goods in the same trip would find this exercise
exasperating. 160
By price. As an alternative example, trademark owners could
push retailers to organize their products by price from low to high or
vice versa. A price-based retailing taxonomy would eliminate retail-
ers' ability to benefit from price differentials to divert consumers from
heavily branded products to cheaper house brands.'
61
Unlike brand-based organization, price-based organization is un-
common among physical space retailers. Some retailers charge a flat
price for all items in the store (such as dollar stores), and others may
arrange products by price within specific product categories. 16 How-
ever, I have not found any physical space retailers that organize their
products entirely by price.
163
There may be good reasons for this. A price-based organization
probably would not be popular with consumers. Consumers who have
strong brand preferences will incur extra search costs trying to map
their desired brands to the retailer's price. Meanwhile, consumers
would also struggle to comparison shop because of the difficulty find-
ing comparable items.
I am not aware of any trademark owners advocating for either
brand-based or price-based organization. However, conceptualizing
the problems associated with alternative taxonomical schemes re-
minds us how much consumers depend on retailers to develop sensi-
160. See id. at 24-45 (discussing the limits of alphabetization as an organizational
scheme including, for example, the likelihood that manufacturers would try to game an
alphabetical scheme by front-loading all their product names into "A," just like Yellow
Pages advertisers do).
161. The retailer could still put higher-margin house brands next to lower-margin
branded products by setting the same price for both. However, if there is no price differen-
tial between the two goods, the likelihood of consumer diversion to the house brand should
drop substantially.
162. This may be an example of the framing effect. A higher-priced product may make
the cheaper product look like a comparative bargain. Psychologist Barry Schwartz gives a
good example of this. A catalog offering a $279 bread maker later added a new $429 bread
maker. The catalog sold relatively few $429 bread makers, but sales for the $279 bread
maker almost doubled. SCHWARTZ, supra note 151, at 62; see Brian Bergstein, Software
Helps Retailers Set Prices for Maximum Profit, WASH. POST, May 20, 2007, at A09 (de-
scribing a retailer who initially offered three drills, priced $90, $120 and $130; by cutting
the $120 drill to $110, the sales ofthe $90 drill dropped4% and the $110 drill rose 11%).
163. Putting aside the consumer inefficiencies, a price-based organizational scheme
would have other inefficiencies in a grocery store context, such as how frozen or refriger-
ated items might be stocked.
In contrast, price-based organization can and is done online. For example, Amazon or-
ganizes its digital music download offerings into price-based categories. Amazon.com:
Special MP3 Deals, http://www.amazon.com/MP3-
Deals/b/ref=?ie=UTF8&node=678551011 (last visited May. 15, 2009) (left hand column
categorizes music by genre and then subcategorizes by price).
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ble and efficient organizational systems that facilitate consumer deci-
sion-making' 64 - including using brand spillovers as part of the
taxonomical options. Indeed, while not every retailing practice im-
proves the efficiency of consumer shopping, retailers compete in part
on the efficiency of their taxonomical organizations, 165 and they can
suffer marketplace consequences when they degrade consumer effi-
ciency.
16 6
2. Online Intermediaries as Search Cost Managers
When retailers create sensible and logical product adjacencies,
they provide search cost management services to consumers. How-
ever, they are not the only search cost managers in our economy. In-
stead, every intermediary between manufacturers and consumers
necessarily provides search cost management services.
In particular, online intermediaries also act as search cost manag-
ers for consumers.167 Just as retailers compete with each other on the
efficiency of their taxonomical organization, search engines compete
to deliver search results that resolve consumers' needs more effi-
ciently. 168 This competition has the socially beneficial effect of lower-
ing consumer search Costs. 169 And just as retailers may choose to use
brand spillovers as part of their search cost management toolkit,
164. See WEINBERGER, supra note 18, at 51-52 (explaining that poor organizational
schemes effectively obscure some entries sufficient to make them invisible).
165. See id. at 1 (explaining that Staples organizes its products as it does "because that's
what our customers told us they want"); UNDERHILL, supra note 19, at 203 (mentioning an
Italian supermarket that organizes its products by meal, i.e., all dinner items grouped to-
gether).
166. For example, when grocers put staples like milk and eggs at the back of the store,
convenience stores can capture market share by positioning those products more conven-
iently. Id. at 82. In response, some grocery stores created a "shallow loop" where the staples
are positioned upfront to compete more effectively with the convenience stores. Id.
167. Yannis Bakos, The Emerging Landscape for Retail E-Commerce, J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES, Winter 2001, at 69, 70; Mark S. Nadel, The Consumer Product Selection
Process in an Internet Age: Obstacles to Maximum Effectiveness and Policy Options, 14
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 183, 186 (2000); Sarkar et al., supra note 75.
168. See Goldman, supra note 75, at 197; Geeking with Greg, Marissa Mayer at Web 2.0,
http://glinden.blogspot.com/2006/l /marissa-mayer-at-web-20.html (Nov. 9, 2006) (de-
scribing how Google tried increasing the number of search results on the page but reversed
the change because the added results slightly slowed down page delivery, which substan-
tially decreased consumer searching).
169. See Pasquale, supra note 76; WEINBERGER, supra note 18, at 6 (explaining why
online organization of goods is better than what is possible in the physical world).
However, some commentators do not believe that there is "competition" among search
engines given Google's high market share. See, e.g., Charles Cooper, So When Do We Get It
Over With and Declare Google a Monopoly?, CNET NEWS, July 22, 2008,
http://news.cnet.com/8301-10787_3-9996710-60.html. Despite this, I still believe that the
search engine marketplace is robust enough to force Google to compete on search cost man-
agement. See Goldman, supra note 75, at 198.
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online intermediaries may use brand spillovers, such as keyword trig-
gering, to reduce consumer search costs.
170
3. Brand Spillovers and Trademark Policy
By definition, brand spillovers are a positive externality - inter-
mediaries and third-party manufacturers derive economic benefits
from assets developed by trademark owners. According to neo-
classical economics, trademark owners will underinvest in their
trademarks because they are not receiving the full economic benefit
from their investments. 171 To prevent this putative underinvestment,
keyword triggering and all other brand spillover activities, such as the
retailer activities described in Part II.B, could be designated as trade-
mark infringement.
On the other hand, designating brand spillovers as trademark in-
fringement may be unnecessary. As Frischmann and Lemley recently
explained, not every spillover needs internalization, and it can be so-
cially inefficient to attempt to correct all spillovers. 172 Indeed, brand
spillovers have been a successful and essential part of our retailing
economy for decades, and there is no evidence that they have caused
trademark owners to diminish their brand investments in any way.
Furthermore, restricting brand spillovers could harm the overall
information flows that consumers need to make marketplace choic-
es. 17 3 As discussed above, intermediaries compete with each other to
lower consumer search costs, and brand spillovers are one of the cost-
reduction tools in the intermediaries' toolkits. If using brand spill-
overs was a trademark infringement, then it would remove some dis-
cretion from intermediaries about how to manage brand spillovers and
vest that decision-making power with trademark owners. It is hard to
see how letting trademark owners decide how to present information
would improve the results for consumers or the market. 174 As dis-
cussed above, trademark owners do not have the expertise about con-
sumer preferences that entities lower down in the distribution chain
have. It seems likely that trademark owners would simply use their
monopolistic powers to increase their wealth at the expense of every-
one else in the chain.
170. The fact that keyword triggering presents ads rather than editorially selected search
results is immaterial to this inquiry. Indeed, Google's ad ranking formula takes into consid-
eration the quality and relevancy of the ads. See Google, supra note 87.
171. Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 283
(2007).
172. Id. at 300; Lemley, supra note 128.
173. Cf David W. Barnes, Trademark Externalities, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1 (2007) (dis-
cussing the value of uninternalized trademark externalities).
174. See Goldman, supra note 75, at 197-98; see also WEINBERGER, supra note 18, at
132-33 (discussing the problems with ownership rights in organizational structures).
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Thus, if brand spillovers constituted trademark infringement, the
result may be higher consumer search costs, 1 75 which would reduce
economic welfare across society. This would be a counterintuitive
result. We typically justify trademark law for its salutary effect on
consumer search Costs, 176 but regulation could produce the directly
opposite result. For trademark law to accomplish its goal, it should
tolerate brand spillovers.
177
V. CONCLUSION
Technology exceptionalism is hardly new. In fact, during the ear-
ly stages of a technology's adoption, exceptionalism is practically
inevitable. 17 However, unwarranted technology exceptionalism can
seriously distort policy-making, so each instance requires rigorous
scrutiny.
The reaction to keyword triggering appears to be a textbook case
of misplaced exceptionalism. Retailers engage in similar behavior
offline but their behavior has been completely immune from trade-
mark scrutiny. Nevertheless, it has proven almost irresistible to char-
acterize the Internet as somehow unique, special, or different and
therefore to overlook the analogous well-settled offline rules.
This temptation may be understandable, but that does not make
the results any less pernicious. Intermediaries can add value in the
distribution chain by helping consumers reduce their search costs, and
third-party trademarks provide an essential tool to facilitate that goal.
As a result, preventing intermediaries from using third-party trade-
marks as a merchandising aid hinders their ability to function as
search cost managers. We all lose in this process: intermediaries be-
come less valuable to consumers; consumers face increased search
costs; and society as a whole suffers reduced wealth from the in-
creased search costs. The appropriate resolution is for trademark law
to accept brand spillovers, both online and offline.
175. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting Doc-
trines in Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1223 (2007).
176. E.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs
on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REv. 777 (2004).
177. Even so, some classes of brand spillovers are - and should be - regulated by other
legal doctrines, such as the prohibition of bait-and-switch under consumer protection laws.
178. See Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Manage-
ment in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 277 (1985) (arguing that courts overreact to the
risks of new technologies).
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